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Abstract
This dissertation presents a model of strategic issue management that 
focuses on the mediational role that interpretation has between monitoring 
and scanning the environment and organizational response. Hypotheses 
concerning the relationships between several dimensions of issue 
interpretation and several dimensions of organizational issue response are 
posited. The strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness within the 
restaurant industry is targeted, and a research methodology constructed for 
testing the hypotheses. Urgency, Understanding, and Capability all had 
significant relationships with the response variables of Magnitude, Locus, 
and Activeness, with Understanding's relationship tending to be curvilinear. 
No variables had a significant effect on Immediacy, though this was 
probably due to methodology constraints. The potential contributions and 
implications of these findings for theory and managerial practice are 
presented and discussed, as are ideas for future research.
vi
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
An emerging topic of concern in the strategic management literature 
involves how organizations respond to unexpected or newly emerging 
situations, be they strategic issues, social issues or competitor moves (i.e., 
Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991). This is an important arena of inquiry since a frequent question 
in these separate streams of literature concerns the factors that influence 
organizational response.
Strategic control concerns scanning the environment in order to 
detect and respond to emerging issues that might endanger the strategic 
course of action and threaten performance, or that may represent 
opportunities that could be exploited (Schendel & Hofer, 1979; Lorange, Scott- 
Morton, &  Ghoshal, 1986; Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987). In general, it is 
preferable to detect such issues as early as possible, when signals are still 
"weak" (Ansoff, 1975), to allow for longer response times. Since the 
interpretation of a particular environmental issue as, for example, an 
opportunity or a threat, to a significant extent can determine what the 
response of the organization will be (Ford & Baucus, 1987; Dutton &  Jackson, 
1987), to understand the interpretation process is to gain understanding of 
not only strategic control, but organizational strategy and strategic change, 
as well. Thus, the way in which organizations interpret strategic issues and 
the factors that influence this interpretation process emerge as topics of 
considerable importance (Daft &  Weick, 1984).
Role of Issue Management
Issue management involves monitoring the internal and external 
environments in order to detect and formulate responses to emerging 
developments that may impact the organization. Issue management can be
1
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found in the strategic management, strategic control, and corporate social 
responsibility literatures. A brief review of the concept of issue 
management in each of these areas serves to demonstrate the theoretical 
ubiquity, and by extension, importance, of issue management.
Strategic management. The relationship of issue management with 
the strategic management literature can be examined by considering its 
similarity within three schools of strategic management thought: the 
traditional "design" school; the "learning" school; and the "positioning" 
school (Mintzberg, 1990).
In more traditional views of strategic management, scanning was 
often viewed as a single step in a formal, synoptic process whereby 
organizational strategies were rationally formulated (for a review of some of 
these see Digman, 1986). Organizations scanned their environments in an 
attempt to identify opportunities and threats that would be used as a partial 
basis for the organization's strategy (Andrews, Learned, Christensen, &  Guth, 
1965; Andrews, 1971). While not explicitly identifying issue management as a 
critical part of the process, included in this deliberate, design-oriented view 
was a recognition of the need to assess and respond to certain factors in the 
environment.
Other approaches have been taken to strategic management, such as 
the idea that strategies can emerge on their own as organizations learn 
(Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). In this framework, strategies 
can sprout up unintendedly, like "weeds in a garden" as organizations face 
and respond to new situations (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). The process of 
issue management is almost synonymous with that of strategy formation in 
this perspective, although this has not been made explicit. Issue
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
management could thus be viewed as one way strategies emerge and change 
over time as the organization faces and responds to different issues.
Also, increasing attention has been paid to competitive rivalry and the 
responses of organizations to the actions of their competitors as part of what 
Mintzberg (1990) termed the positioning school (Porter, 1980, 1985). Here, 
issues are represented by the competitive moves of a rival organization and 
the research in this area has focused on the factors that influence what the 
response will be (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Smith, et. al., 1991). While the 
stress in the design approach is on scanning, and that of the learning 
approach is on strategy emergence over time, the positioning approach 
focuses on responding to discrete and easily identifiable events and has 
yielded some explicit findings that will be reviewed later.
It should be stressed that in all three of these examples of different 
schools of thought in strategic management, issue management is present at 
least implicitly, and in some cases very explicitly.
Strategic control. Within the area of strategic management, the topic 
of strategic control relates even more strongly to issue management than the 
literature on strategy formation. Although a relatively neglected topic in 
the past (Shrivistava, 1987), strategic control has been the center of 
increasing attention (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987; Lorange, 1988; Goold & 
Quinn, 1990; Preble, 1992). The concept of strategic control has been refined 
since Schendel and Hofer (1979) identified it as an important area in 
strategic management.
Strategic control is pictured at three levels: implementation control, 
where the implementation of the strategy is monitored; premise control, 
where critical success factors are monitored; and strategic surveillance, 
which is the broad-based monitoring of the environment for significant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
developments (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987; Preble, 1992). The strategic 
surveillance component is essentially synonymous with issue management, 
since it involves scanning for developments that may have a significant 
impact on the organization's strategy (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987). 
Implementation and premise control are conceptualized as narrowing the 
focus of the organization and strategic surveillance, i.e., issue management, 
is required so that an organization will not be blind-sided by an 
unanticipated development (Preble, 1992).
The literature on strategic control is still primarily prescriptive and 
lacking in theoretical development (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987). Given 
its overlap with strategic control, empirical research on issue management 
represents one avenue toward strengthening this area.
Corporate social responsibility. Issue management has represented an 
important component of corporate social responsibility models for some time 
(Carroll, 1979; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991a, 1991b). Issue 
management is pictured as one of the processes an organization can engage 
in to be socially responsive (Ackerman, 1975; Wood, 1991b). The issues that 
the organization should manage in this case emanate from the social 
environment, and the manner and immediacy of the organization's response 
has been viewed as a litmus test on the organization's social responsiveness 
(Carroll, 1979).
Issue management has also been influenced by the area of public 
relations, where much of the early research on issue management occurred 
(Chase, 1977). The actual practice of issue management, as well as its 
conceptual development, has reached its fullest expression in the area of 
public affairs and public relations (Chase, 1984; Heath & Nelson, 1986). This 
is to be expected since public affairs is concerned with gathering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intelligence on the social (i.e. non commercial) environment and the 
development of action plans directed toward this environment 
(Nagelschmidt, 1982). While public relations is primarily concerned with the 
use of communication to maintain a corporation's image, and public affairs 
tends to focus on governmental activity, issue management was pictured as a 
way to combine social policy with business policy (Heath & Nelson, 1986; 
Wood, 1991b).
It is also possible to include work in the institutional tradition (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977), or at least an 
extension of it, in the area of issue management in social responsibility. 
Oliver (1991) demonstrates how organizations in different circumstances 
respond to institutional pressures by combining institutional thought with 
ideas from the resource dependence school (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Oliver 
provides an elaborate list of institutional antecedents and the impact that 
each of these may have on the types of responses an organization might 
make, ranging from acquiescence to manipulation (1991).
Issue management has been cited as one area in corporate social 
responsibility needing further research (Wood, 1991b). Thus, given that 
issue management relates to strategic management, strategic control, and 
corporate social responsibility, research in the area of strategic issue 
management has potential relevance in a wide range of areas.
Attention now turns to the focus of this dissertation, strategic issue 
management. Strategic issue management (SIM), while having similar roots 
to some of the areas above, has a slightly divergent path of development. 
This will be demonstrated by tracing the academic and conceptual 
development of strategic issue management, and by giving evidence of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
commonality of SIM with the other types of issue management discussed 
above through a brief discussion of its use in practice.
Development and Roots of Strategic Issue Management
Academic management. Managing strategic issues was first discussed 
within the context of how to avoid strategic surprises (Ansoff, 1975). This 
could be accomplished by scanning for "weak signals" in the external 
environment and responding to them while there was still time to be 
proactive. Ansoff suggested that at first the response should be small in 
scale, in keeping with the equivocality of a weak signal. As the signal 
strengthened, however, the organization's response should grow in 
magnitude. Ansoff (1980) offered a more robust conceptualization of SIM by 
examining its strong signal and weak signal forms and included a graphic 
model of the relationship between forecast horizon and response time. He 
also stressed the superiority of SIM over periodic strategic management 
systems. A similar approach appeared in King (1982) where a process model 
of strategic issue analysis was explicated.
An important conceptual advance was made in Dutton, Fahey, and 
Narayanan (1983). Their focus was on a part of SIM, strategic issue diagnosis, 
whereby stimuli are ordered into issues and interpretation occurs. They 
presented a three-stage, recursive model containing inputs, processes, and 
outputs. The recognition that interpretation plays a part in SIM was a 
significant contribution, and much of the literature on SIM has included 
interpretation as an important component. Also significant was the 
suggestion that inputs other than characteristics of the issue itself would be 
important, for example cognitive maps and political interests.
Dutton and her associates continued to make contributions in the area 
of SIM. The overall SIM system was the focus of Dutton and Ottensmeyer
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(1987). Relating the strategic issue literature to that from public affairs and 
relations and building on the interpretational model of Daft and Weick 
(1984), Dutton and Ottensmeyer developed a typology of SIM systems 
according to the source of the issue (internal versus external) and the 
activity scope (active versus passive). The symbolic, as opposed to 
instrumental, aspects of SIM systems were explored, as well. SIM systems 
were pictured as helping organizations better adapt to their environments, 
and so Dutton and Ottensmeyer also included propositions concerning the 
effect of the environment on SIM.
Dutton and Duncan (1987) continued the previous focus on strategic 
issue diagnosis by exploring how certain organizational factors influence 
issue interpretation and on how the kinds of issue interpretations made 
influence the momentum for change. Issues are diagnosed and interpreted 
according to their urgency and the feasibility of making a response to them. 
As an issue is seen to be more urgent or a response to it more feasible, the 
momentum for change is greater.
Dutton and Jackson (1987) examined the categorization of issues into 
opportunities or threats and explored the factors that would lead to either 
interpretation. Issues that are controllable, positive or represent a potential 
gain are likely to be viewed as opportunities, for example. Propositions 
concerning the effects of certain process characteristics on interpretation 
were forwarded, and the impact of interpretation on issue response explored. 
The last two articles represented a turn of attention away from the overall 
system and toward the interpretationa! /diagnostic aspects of SIM. This focus 
has been continued in other work.
For example, Dutton, Walton, and Abrahamson (1989) empirically 
investigated the dimensions that decision makers use to sort strategic issues
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and found that those dimensions proposed by theory were not necessarily the 
ones used in practice. Jackson and Dutton (1988) studied the types of factors 
that were associated with the labels of opportunity and threat and found that 
decision makers were more sensitive to issues labeled "threats" as opposed to 
issues labeled "opportunities." Thomas and McDaniel (1990) examined the 
effect that strategy and information processing characteristics have on issue 
interpretation and found significant relationships with both. Sallivan and 
Nonaka (1988) looked for and found a relationship between national culture 
and issue interpretation.
Some recent empirical work in the SIM area has examined the impact 
of interpretation on response, as well. Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner (1990) 
investigated the effect of issue interpretation on the allocation of resources 
and found some significant relationships. Support was also found for some of 
the propositions for change posited in Dutton and Duncan (1987) related to 
urgency, feasibility, and momentum. The impact of national culture on both 
interpretation and issue response was found to be significant in Schneider 
and de Meyer (1991). These researchers also developed a multi-level model of 
other contextual influences on interpretation as well as response. Finally, in 
what represented a significant empirical advance in the SIM area, Dutton 
and Dukerich (1991) outlined how the organizational context influenced the 
development and interpretation of an actual strategic issue. Previous 
empirical work had used case studies while this research used a qualitative 
approach and an examination of how a single organization reacted to a 
developing strategic issue over time.
From a process or stage-related approach in its infancy, the SIM 
literature began to examine particular parts of the SIM process. For example, 
the diagnosis and interpretation of strategic issues as well as the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
organization's response to those issues is now the current focus of the 
academic SIM field. This dissertation will make its contribution along these 
lines by examining the interpretations and responses of organizations 
within an industry to an emergent strategic issue.
Practice. The development of SIM within academia has been relatively 
isolated from other streams of inquiry, except strategic management. This 
has not been the case in the practice of SIM, however, which has been very 
closely involved with public affairs (Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987). The 
origins of public issue management go back to the turn of the century 
(Heath & Nelson, 1986). Organizations from time to time were forced to deal 
with issues emerging from the social sector of their business environment 
and responded to them through various means, ranging from some very 
defensive-reactionary (Carroll, 1979) responses to what could be called 
"proactive" attempts to sway public opinion (Heath & Nelson, 1986: 55-59). 
These early responses involved advance agents, lobbyists, press agents, and 
publicity bureaus (Ewing, 1982).
The situation was to continue in this mode for some time, even through 
the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. It was during this time that organizational 
legitimacy was widely questioned due to various significant public issues 
such as pollution, product and worker safety, corporate power and 
discrimination (Steiner & Steiner, 1988). By the mid-1970s, after years of 
dealing with an increasingly harsh social environment, issue management 
emerged at the overlap of the two separate functions of public relations and 
strategic planning (Ewing, 1982). It was pictured as the relating of the 
public policy area to the business policy one, as the taking of a more 
proactive stance toward issues that often were viewed only as problems and 
never as opportunities (Chase, 1984). It has been said, however, that the new
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
"issue management" was really nothing more than a new phrase for what 
had been going on in public relations for some time (Ehling & Hesse, 1982).
The precipitation of interest in issue management during the 1970s 
was largely due to Howard Chase, who coined the phrase, was active in 
promoting this "new" idea, and formed the Issues Management Association in 
1982, which had over 400 members by the mid-1980s (Dutton &  Ottensmeyer, 
1987). The increased exposure of this idea has led to increased corporate 
interest to implement issue management systems. In the form they are 
usually discussed, these systems are synonymous with SIM systems, in that 
they identify emerging trends likely to affect the organization and develop a 
wider and more positive range of responses to them (Coates, Coates, Jarratt, & 
Heinz, 1986). Some recent trends in practice have been the willingness of 
higher-level executives to get involved with managing issues instead of 
leaving it to issue managers, and the tendency of different organizations to 
cooperate on a collective response to public issues (Littlejohn, 1986).
Thus, SIM and public issues management are quite similar in practice 
and can be thought of as synonymous. The primary difference is that SIM is 
somewhat broader in conception, and can be thought of as the general model 
of which public issues management is a special case.
Summary
Issue management was presented as having influence on several areas 
of management theory. It has either a direct or indirect impact on strategic 
management, strategic control, and corporate social responsibility. It was 
argued that strategic issue management is an area worthy of further study 
since the potential findings related to it can affect several different streams 
of literature simultaneously. Then the conceptual roots and development of 
SIM were traced, starting with AnsofPs seminal works on the subject. This
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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review demonstrated a shifting focus from the overall system, to response 
times, to the importance of interpretation and diagnosis, and finally, to the 
impact of interpretation on response. This last area was identified as the 
subject of this dissertation. Then it was demonstrated that while the 
conceptual development of SIM was relatively autonomous of other areas of 
issue management, in practice it is difficult to differentiate SIM from public 
issue management. It was suggested that SIM could be viewed as a general 
model of issue management, while public issue management would appear as 
a special case, given its focus on the social sector of the environment. 
Organization of Remaining Chanters
Chapter 1 established issue management as an important area. In 
Chapter 2, a more thorough review of the literature is made related to SIM 
models, the importance of interpretation, and the literature on 
organizational responses to different kinds of events This chapter concludes 
with a model of issue interpretation and response. In Chapter 3, specific 
hypotheses describing the relationship between interpretation and response 
are posited. Chapter 4 contains the methodological design for testing them. 
Data analysis and results are presented in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 
summarizes the significance of the findings and explores their implications 
for practice, theory, and future research.
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Chapter 2 - Strategic Issue Management 
Models and Related Literature 
This chapter begins with a review of models of the strategic issue 
management process, with particular focus on the stages of interpretation 
and response. The important role that interpretation plays in the process is 
then discussed and a review of the different streams of literature that address 
organizational responses included. Then, a model of issue interpretation and 
response is presented. A brief summary of the relationship between issue 
interpretation and response closes the chapter.
Strategic Issue Management Models
Strategic issue management is the interpretational process whereby 
organizations identify, analyze, and respond to strategic issues. Strategic 
issues are emerging developments that can have a major impact on the 
organization's strategy (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & 
Ottensmeyer, 1987). (This definition, as well as others relevant to this 
dissertation, are listed in Appendix A.) Various models of issue management 
and SIM have been suggested over the years, most of them containing the 
three stages of identification, analysis, and response suggested above. Table 
1 contains a summary of the following review.
To highlight the interpretational nature of SIM activity, Daft and 
Weick (1984) are included in Table 1 first. They presented organizations as 
interpretation systems and modeled the behavior of organizations as 
following a three-step process: scanning, where data are collected; 
interpretation, where data are given meaning; and learning, where action is 
taken. These three steps line up with the three SIM steps of identification, 
analysis, and response. Although other models have used different 
terminology, it is possible to demonstrate the correspondence of most of the
12
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Table 1 - Summary of Strategic Issue Management Models
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following models with this three-stage interpretation process. Frequent 
consultation of Table 1 through the reading of this section will support this 
assertion.
Ansoff (1980) pictured SIM as beginning with monitoring. Trends in 
the external and internal environments, as well as performance trends, are 
tracked continuously. The SWOT framework (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; 
Hofer & Schendel, 1978) is applied to data from these sources to identify 
strategic issues. Based on an assessment as to the issues' potential impact and 
urgency, an issue assignment is made, where management makes a decision 
on what action to take. The responses in Ansoff's model are taking no action 
at all, continuing to monitor the issue, taking delayed action, and taking 
immediate action.
King (1982) narrowed the focus somewhat in that he did not explicitly 
include a response step. Starting with identification of the issue, a formal 
statement of the issue is developed, followed by the development of a model 
describing the issue and its potential impact and development. This issue 
model, representing the output of strategic issue analysis, is then used in the 
regular planning process of the organization. This model seems to place SIM 
in an overly-subservient role in relation to the periodic planning process, a 
role that Ansoff would probably dispute (1975, 1980).
An alternative view of issue management was presented in Coates, et. 
al. (1986). Here the process begins with issue identification followed by 
continued scanning, monitoring, and tracking. The information is then 
analyzed and priorities are set as to which issues are most important. Based 
on these priorities, the issues are assigned to either a policy or strategic 
implementation path, depending on the lead-time of the response. Here
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again SIM is viewed as subservient to planning, with the output of the 
process being a priority ranking.
Chase (1984) presented a view of SIM as relatively autonomous, in 
keeping with his stress of the importance of this "new" function. The 
process begins with issue identification, the consideration of trends that lead 
to issues. In the second step, issue analysis, the issues are researched and 
various theories are forwarded to account for them. The third step, issue 
change strategy options, is where priorities are set and response plans are 
selected. Steps two and three fit within analysis and interpretation in Table 
1. The fourth stage represents the development of the issue action program 
to support the selected issue responses. Periodic planning in this model is 
viewed as supportive of SIM.
Much of the later work on SIM models has built on Ansoff's (1980) 
model. In these later models, SIM as autonomous from periodic planning and 
the existence of an interpretation-like stage have been taken as given. If 
anything, the focus has narrowed somewhat, centering on issue 
interpretation and the impact it has on issue response.
Dutton, et. al. set the stage for much of the work to follow by 
presenting a model of strategic issue diagnosis (SID), the process whereby 
data and stimuli are translated into issues and these issues are interpreted 
(1983: 307-8). This is an extension of Ansoff's (1980) impact and urgency 
assessment step.
After demonstrating that diagnosis has been considered an important 
step in strategic management, not to mention SIM, Dutton, et. al. presented a 
three-stage model. The inputs of SID are cognitive maps, political interests, 
and issue characteristics, and these are weighed in a process varying 
according to its recursiveness, retroductivity, and heterarchy. Based on the
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interplay between these two sets of factors, outputs of assumptions, cause- 
effect relationships, predictive judgments, and labels emerge. Although the 
outputs are viewed as affecting the inputs, SID can be linked with SIM at this 
point by realizing that the outputs of diagnosis influence the kind of 
response the organization makes, and thus "outputs" is placed under the 
response column in Table 1. The emphasis in this model is on the complexity 
of the environment and the difficulty that managers have in making sense 
of it. Strategic issue diagnosis was presented as one way this sense-making 
occurs.
Variation and further development of strategic issue diagnosis were 
presented in Dutton and Duncan (1987). Again, a three-stage model was 
posited, consisting of an activation stage, followed by issue assessment, 
leading to a diagnosis outcome. A strategic issue diagnosis episode is 
triggered either through gap analysis or stakeholder demands. This leads to 
two assessments being made in the second stage. The urgency assessment 
concerns how important it is for the organization to act on this issue and the 
feasibility assessment relates to how likely it is that the organization can 
implement an effective issue response. These assessments in turn affect the 
momentum for change that will determine the magnitude of the response, 
either radical or incremental. This model emphasized even more than Ansoff 
(1980) the types of assessments made during issue diagnosis and 
interpretation.
This model was in turn, further developed and modified in Dutton, et. 
al. (1990). In a model directed toward the response end of the SIM process, 
issue perceptions were seen to influence issue assessment, which in turn 
influences the investment of managerial and organizational resources to 
deal with an issue. Perceptions of the issue's expected duration, the locus of
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responsibility for the issue, and the issue's visibility affect the urgency 
assessment. Perceptions of the level of understanding the organization has 
of an issue and the capability of the organization to respond were argued to 
affect the feasibility assessment. These assessments influence the allocation 
of money, time, and the priority an issue receives.
Some more recent models have included contextual influences on SIM. 
For example, Thomas and McDaniel (1990) presented a cross-level model of 
strategic issue interpretation. Organization-level phenomena independent 
of the strategic issue impact an individual's (in this case the CEO's) issue 
interpretation that influences strategic action at the organization level. The 
organizational context and the cognitive processes of the CEO will influence 
the kinds of interpretations the CEO makes. Similarly, Milliken (1990) posited 
that different organizational characteristics will affect the interpretation 
process.
Following in this new trend of including contextual influences, 
Schneider and de Meyer (1991) presented an elaborate model of the 
determinants of strategic issue interpretation and response. Here context 
influences interpretation and interpretation then influences response. 
Individual, group, organizational, and environmental factors affect issue 
interpretation. In turn, issue interpretation influences issue response, 
which may also be directly affected by the contextual factors.
The trend in SIM models has been away from mere chronological 
relationships (i.e., first step one occurs followed by step two, and so on) and 
toward more causal ones, which are more amenable to empirical testing. Two 
areas of considerable interest emerge from this review of the SIM literature. 
The context surrounding the SIM process is presented as being important, 
and many relationships between different contextual factors and
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interpretation are possible. Some hypotheses related to context have been 
tested, for example Milliken (1990) and Thomas and McDaniel (1990). These 
researchers did find significant relationships between some aspects of 
context and interpretation.
The second area of interest is the relationship between interpretation 
and response. Asked another way: What kinds of interpretations lead to what 
kinds of responses? Dutton and Jackson (1987) posited ten hypotheses 
concerning the links between issue interpretation and organizational action. 
For example, if an issue is seen as a threat, the organization is likely to enact 
a revolutionary, internal-directed response. Issues perceived as 
opportunities, however, would lead to incremental, external-directed  
responses. Dutton, et. al. (1990) indirectly tested some of these ideas, finding 
that issue interpretation affected the commitment of time to an issue and the 
issue's priority. Their study did not use actual issues or organizations, but two 
behavioral simulations of organizations. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) used a 
longitudinal, case-study methodology to study an organization's responses to 
a strategic issue. They found that the issue's affect on the organization's 
image and identity were crucial factors in determining the organization's 
response.
No study has specifically examined the impact of issue interpretation 
on response to an actual strategic issue in a field setting using more than one 
organization. For example, Dutton and Webster (1988) examined the impact of 
interpretation on response but used an artificial, organizational in-basket, 
setting. Milliken (1990) examined interpretation of an actual strategic issue 
using a sample of many organizations but did not investigate any links with 
response. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) examined how interpretation of an 
actual strategic issue affected responses to it, but only at a single
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organization. Thomas, Clark, and Gioia (1993) examined interpretation and 
response in a multi-organization sample but used interpretations of artificial 
case studies rather than an actual strategic issue. Consequently, the 
subsequent actions these organizations took were not necessarily in response 
to the issues identified in the case studies. The effects found in this study 
were more closely related to how interpretational tendencies influenced 
subsequent strategic actions and not how interpretations of an actual 
strategic issue influenced response to that issue.
Research conducted in artificial settings or consisting of single-case 
studies may lack external validity, and hence, not be applicable beyond the 
artificial environment or the single organization that was the subject of 
study (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1990). This dissertation fills a 
gap in the literature by testing relationships between interpretation and 
response to an actual strategic issue using data from executives in a single­
industry. As such, it tests a portion of some of the models outlined above 
which include an interpretation-response link. It will also yield information 
on the nature of the relationships between issue interpretation and  
response. This research is prescriptive in nature, rather than normative, 
given that performance outcomes are not measured. Next, a review of the 
literature on interpretation and organizational responses is made. Then the 
model of SIM that will be used in this dissertation is presented. A brief 
summary then concludes Chapter 2.
Issue Interpretation
Three views of the environment -- (1) objective, (2) subjective, and (3) 
enacted -- are based on different assumptions about the environm ent 
(Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). The objective environment and the perceived 
environment viewpoints are simply variations on the same theme. In them,
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the environment is real, imposing constraints and demands to which the 
organization must adapt. The objective view assumes that decision makers 
can know all they need to know to design appropriate strategies, while the 
perceived view assumes boundedly-rational organizational actors (Lord & 
Maher, 1990). The third view pictures organizations and environments 
being created together through social interaction processes (Weick, 1979) 
and asserts that separate, objective environments, as such, do not exist. 
While drawing on literature based on the enacted environment view, this 
research is firmly grounded in the perceived environment perspective.
Organizations act on their perceptions of the environment since this 
represents essential reality to them. The order that does exist in an 
organization's environment may be quite subtle, and organizational attempts 
to model such order are inhibited by the limited and intended rationality of 
decision makers involved in these efforts (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert &  
March, 1963). The organization must attempt to impose some order on the 
seemingly unordered experiences it faces in the environment (Weick & Daft, 
1983).
Organizations tend to package these experiences into strategic "issues" 
to organize attention and interpretation (Dutton, et. al., 1983). Though the 
identification of strategic issues has been viewed as a sense-making or order- 
imposing mechanism, implying that each organization's conceptualization of 
an issue will be unique, the set of stimuli that generate a strategic issue 
diagnosis episode (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) would be common to all 
organizations facing it. Thus, the actual confluence of events can be thought 
of as a "real" strategic issue that exists independent of any observer's 
attempts to identify or define it, as implied in Ansoff (1975, 1980). The 
existence of environments and issues independent of observers fits with the
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perceived environment view (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Downey & Slocum, 
1975; 1982).
Daft and Weick (1984) discussed the importance of interpretation in 
understanding macro-organizational behavior. They pictured interpretation 
as a mediational stage between data collection and action taking where the 
data are analyzed, or given meaning. Ford and Baucus (1987) also recognized 
the importance of interpretation. They modeled interpretation as affecting 
the kinds of responses that an organization would make to a performance 
downturn, an event that could easily be considered a strategic issue (Ansoff, 
1980), though in this case an idiosyncratic one. They went further to argue 
that it is impossible to design an organization that is free of interpretation 
(Ford & Baucus, 1987: 376) since it is central to organizational activity.
The importance of interpretational activity has also been stressed in 
Nottenburg and Fedor (1983), where it is seen as mediating between scarcity 
in the environment and organizational responses to it. Interpretations are 
not rigid and unchanging, but pliable and evolving, and usually do not stop 
changing until well after an event has unfolded (Isabella, 1990). Both 
Thomas and McDaniel (1990) and Schneider and de Meyer (1991) examine 
interpretations made of strategic issues and argue that these interpretations 
influence the response an organization makes. This survey of the literature 
indicates a consensus concerning the necessity of a mediational step between 
data collection and organizational response.
By reviewing the literature on interpretation, the importance of a 
mediating, data-analysis type step in the SIM process has been established. 
Next, the literature on organizational responses to different events and the 
factors that influence them will be reviewed.
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Organizational Responses
The literature on organizational responses to emerging developments 
can be divided into three streams: responses to strategic issues; responses to 
social issues; and responses to competitor activities. Each will be reviewed in 
turn.
Responses to strategic issues. Dutton and Jackson (1987) hypothesized 
that interpretation would affect organizational responses. They posited that 
categorizing an issue as a threat would lead to internal-directed responses 
and responses of large magnitude. Opportunities, on the other hand, lead to 
external-directed responses and responses of small magnitude. These 
hypotheses have not been tested as stated, although some studies (Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987; Dutton & Webster, 1988; Dutton, et. al., 1990; Schneider &  de 
Meyer, 1991; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) do have some bearing on them.
Assessments as to an issue's feasibility of resolution and urgency are 
also seen as affecting organizational responses (Dutton &  Duncan 1987). The 
greater the urgency of an issue and the greater the feasibility to resolve an 
issue the greater the momentum for change, which leads to responses that 
are relatively large in magnitude. These propositions have not been directly 
tested either.
As for empirical research, five studies have bearing on organizational 
responses to strategic issues. Dutton and Webster (1988) found that 
managerial interest in issues was correlated positively with the feasibility of 
resolving them. This can be viewed as supportive of Dutton and Duncan 
(1987). Dutton, et. al. (1990) found that an issue's urgency and 
interdependence with other issues predicted manager's allocation of time to 
that issue and how much of a priority an issue was considered to be. This
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result is also broadly supportive of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) framework. 
The methodology employed was an organizational in-basket simulation.
Although Schneider and de Meyer (1991) did not explicitly consider 
the relationship between interpretation and response, their results 
indirectly suggest that such a relationship may exist, though the two 
variables would be spuriously related to national culture. This is because 
they focused on the effect of culture on both interpretation and response, 
rather than the link between them. Latin Europeans were more likely to 
interpret an issue as a crisis or threat and were also more likely to 
recommend more proactive responses. The methodology employed was 
respondent analysis of a case study.
Along somewhat different lines, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) found 
that organizational identity and image influenced an organization's 
responses to the issue of homelessness. Image and identity were found to 
influence issue interpretations and motivations for responding to the issue. 
The effect was not concurrent, but issue interpretation and motivation to 
respond evolved over time within limits set by identity and image. 
Interpretation and motivation also influenced the responses taken. The 
methodology employed was an in-depth case study of a single organization.
Thomas, et. al. (1993) came closest to testing the impact of 
interpretation on response in a large-sample field setting. Using case studies 
to simulate realistic strategic issues, they hypothesized that interpretational 
labels of positive-gain and controllable would be positively related to 
subsequent product and service changes in hospitals. Only the hypothesis 
for controllability was supported. Although very methodologically sound, 
their use of case studies in lieu of an actual strategic issue makes 
interpreting their findings somewhat problematic. Subsequent changes may
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not have been in response to the issues the case studies highlighted. There 
was no way of knowing whether or not a product or service change was in 
response to the issues interpreted in the case studies or in response to 
something else. Their findings actually relate more closely to 
interpretational tendencies (revealed in the analysis of artificial case 
studies) influencing subsequent organizational activity, and not a direct 
interpretation-response link.
While relationships between issue interpretation and response have 
been suggested, as has been demonstrated, a direct test has not yet been made. 
This represents an area where further empirical research is needed.
Responses to social issues. The literature on responses to social issues 
is related to public affairs (Arrington & Sawaya, 1984), public relations 
(Cheney &  Vibbert, 1987), and social responsibility (Wartick & Cochran,
1985). There are articles within these traditions that relate to issue 
management and response and these will be the focus of this review.
Though concerns with what could be termed "social responsiveness" 
go back for decades (see Cheney & Vibbert, 1987; Heath & Nelson, 1986) it was 
during the mid- to late-1970s that this concern began to coalesce around 
managing issues. This was due to the myriad of social issues that businesses 
had to face for the first time that arose in the late 1960s to early 1970s 
(Wartick & Cochran, 1985). Much of the literature addresses responses to 
social and public issues in a pragmatic or case-study manner (for examples 
see Marx, 1986; Littlejohn, 1986; Wartick & Rude, 1986). Several articles, 
however, did address organizational responses to social and public issues and 
these will be examined more closely.
A conceptual framework for evaluating response patterns o f 
businesses was developed in Sethi (1979). These patterns can be
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characterized as social obligation (do what is required by law), social 
responsibility (mitigate the negative impacts of an issue), and social 
responsiveness (promote positive change). Using the infant formula foods 
controversy as the issue of interest, Sethi traces how different companies 
progressed along the three patterns as the issue developed. Initially, all five 
companies exhibited a social obligation response pattern. As time passed, 
however, the companies diverged in the types of patterns they exhibited. By 
the end of the analysis period, one company was still in a social obligation 
pattern, three were classified as social responsibility, and one had progressed 
to social responsiveness. The reason the response patterns for different 
companies diverged over time was not explored systematically, and the 
question was left unaddressed.
Social demands arising in society were recognized as potential 
strategic issues in Arcelus and Schaefer (1982). After breaking down the life 
cycle of social demands into various stages, the authors suggest that it is 
advantageous for organizations to respond as early in the life cycle as 
possible because social demands can have a strategic-level impact. Their 
discussion of why early responses would be preferred represents one 
explanation why different firms respond differently. Early response ought 
to make the development of an efficient response more likely, enable an 
organization to gain a competitive edge, allow the organization to participate 
in the political-social decision-making process, and to avoid the unfavorable 
pressure that various groups can bring to bear on a slow-to-respond 
organization (Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982: 351-352). It is likely that perceptions 
of these advantages may differ across firms. These perceptual differences 
would explain the different response patterns noted by Sethi (1979). Not
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addressed were the factors that might lead to these perceptual differences, 
however.
Social issues management was identified as an important component of 
corporate social performance in Wartick and Cochran (1985). They 
recognized the different areas of issue management: strategic, public, and 
social issues (Wartick & Cochran, 1985: 766) and that they were essentially 
the same thing, but did not integrate the different literatures into a single 
framework. Issues management is pictured as a way to implement corporate 
social performance policies and represents the third leg of their social 
performance model.
Another comparative study of the responses of different companies to 
a social issue was made in Paul and Duffy (1988), where the actions of four 
large investors in South Africa taken in response to pressures to disinvest 
are traced. While the different patterns of response of each company were 
noted, no systematic attempt was made to account for these differences.
The greatest conceptual advance concerning issue response in this 
area was made by Oliver (1991). Although not investigating responses to 
issues (her work was grounded in institutional theory), her research led to a 
list of institutional antecedents to strategic responses. The thorough list she 
generated included the cause of the institutional pressure (social or 
economic), the identity of the constituents exercising the pressure, the 
nature of the constraints being imposed, the means through which the 
pressure is being exerted, and the environmental context within which the 
pressures are being exerted (Oliver, 1991: 160). Organizations are theorized to 
respond along a continuum of strategies ranging from outright acquiescence 
to the pressures to attempts to manipulate the institutional processes 
involved (Oliver, 1991: 152). This framework represents a rigorous
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explanation of what leads to differential response patterns on the parts of 
different businesses, something lacking until then.
Goodstein (1994) tested Oliver's model using employer involvement in 
work-family issues and found that organizational size, the percentage of 
female employees, and the diffusion of norms of dealing with such issues in 
the same industry and country were all positively related to responsiveness. 
These findings were taken as supportive of Oliver's institutional model.
Wood (1991a, 1991b) identified issues management as an important 
component of corporate social performance. Issues management was argued 
to be a process of social responsiveness, placing the emphasis, as it most 
often has been in the area of social issues management, on the act of 
responding (Wood, 1991b). Most of the research done in this area, however, 
has not focused on the response stage, but on those activities leading to it 
(Wood, 1991a).
A review of the conceptual and empirical literature in the area of 
social and public issues response reveals something of a gap. While progress 
has been made in addressing this topic, little rigorous conceptual 
development has occurred that would advance our understanding about what 
types of antecedents lead to what kinds of responses but for Oliver (1991). 
The ideas that have been forwarded have not been thoroughly tested. This 
dissertation will make its contribution to this stream of literature on this 
point.
Responses to competitor's moves. Most of the empirical work on 
organizational responses has occurred not in the issues management area, 
but in the literature on responses to competitive moves. What follows is a 
review of this literature indicating its relevance to responses to strategic 
issues.
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MacMillan, McCaffery, and Wijk (1985) studied the reaction of banks to 
commercial banking product introductions. They examined the impact of 
several different factors on lagtime, or the time it took for a bank to respond 
to a new product offered by a competitor. It was found that banks responded 
more quickly when the product launch was visible to other banks, the extent 
to which the product was not radically different from existing products; the 
easier it was to offer a similar product, the degree to which the new product 
would fit well with existing products, and the extent to which the new 
product attacked a strategically important customer group.
Operating within an interpretation framework, Smith and Grimm 
(1991) produced a list of hypotheses relating response timing to a host of 
contextual factors. Some of the factors that influence the timing of 
competitive responses relate to information contained in the competitive 
action, characteristics of the initiating firm, and the competitive action 
itself. The competitive environment, as well as organizational and 
demographic characteristics, is also hypothesized to be important.
Some of these ideas were empirically tested in Smith, et. al. (1991). 
Corporate responses to strategic actions were characterized into four 
attributes: the degree to which the response imitated the initiating action, 
the likelihood that a firm would respond, the lag of the response, and how 
fast the firm responded relative to its competitors. They found that 
contextual factors such as the orientation of the firm, structure, slack, and 
demographic characteristics of management affected competitive response 
in some fashion. They also concluded that the manner in which a firm 
interprets and processes information has an impact on response, but the 
impact of specific types of interpretations was not assessed.
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Chen, Smith, and Grimm (1992) studied competitive responses to the 
actions of rival firms. The following relationships obtained. The importance 
of the market under attack is positively related to the number of responses 
and, unexpectedly, negatively to the timing of the response. Also, the 
greater the effort required to implement the initial action, the fewer the 
number of responses and the longer the time taken to respond. Initial 
actions viewed as strategic, as opposed to tactical, also had the same effect on 
responses. Their findings were taken to mean that the more difficult an 
action would be to respond to, the lower in magnitude and the slower in 
timing the response would be.
Though not directly addressing issue management, studies from the 
literature on competitive responses are quite relevant to studies of responses 
to strategic issues. Most of the studies listed above recognize the importance 
of interpretation and reference the strategic issue management literature. 
This dissertation has the potential to make a contribution to understanding 
responses to different kinds of competitive actions, an area of the strategic 
management literature that has been relatively unresearched until recently 
(Smith & Grimm, 1991).
To summarize, the study of organizational responses to strategic issues 
can be informed from various literatures and has the potential to provide 
useful information to them, in turn. This indicates the importance of this 
dissertation and provides a framework for better understanding the 
implications of the results.
Model of Issue Interpretation and Response
A model of issue interpretation and response appears in Figure 1. The 
characteristics of the issue and the context in which interpretation occurs 
affect interpretation. Although these links will not be examined in this
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dissertation, they are included for the sake of conceptual completeness. Issue 
interpretation, in turn, affects issue response.
Characteristics
Interpretation
Context
Intemretation ResDonse
Urgency
Magnitude
Understanding
Immediacy
Capability
Locus
Activeness
Figure 1 - Model of Issue Interpretation and Response
The following example demonstrates the different components of this 
model. Several years ago the Food and Drug Administration decided to hold 
hearings on the idea of requiring more extensive nutritional labeling on 
food. Nutrition labeling clearly represented a strategic issue for packaged 
food companies. How would they respond?
Referencing Figure 1, both the characteristics of the issue itself and 
the context will influence the kinds of interpretations an organization would 
make. Some of the issue characteristics might be: the sector of the 
environment in which the issue originated (in this case, the legal- 
governmental one); the manner in which the issue becomes known (a public 
announcement); and identity of the stakeholder groups that were involved 
during the issue's beginning (consumer advocacy groups, the federal 
government). These factors have an impact on how an organization views 
an emerging strategic issue. Some contextual factors could be: the kind of 
scanning and monitoring system the organization has (formal or informal);
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the organization's perceptions of its task environment (perhaps non 
munificent); and the particular strategy the organization is following 
(prospector or defender). These would have filtering effects on the data 
about the issue coming into the organization (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993).
Each organization would then make an assessment as to the degree of 
urgency, understanding, and capability that exists with the issue of labeling 
regulations. An interpretation of high urgency could indicate that the 
organization believes that it must take some kind of action soon in response 
to this issue. An interpretation of high understanding might mean that the 
organization believes it comprehends the regulatory situation in Washington 
and knows of several alternatives that it could implement in response. An 
interpretation of high capability could mean that the organization believes it 
has the resources necessary to respond to this issue. The types of 
interpretations made would affect the kind of response the organization will 
make.
Responses vary in magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness. A 
response of large magnitude could be a total overhaul of labeling procedures 
in a company, for example. An immediate response would be one taken soon 
after the announcement of hearings was made. This would be regardless of 
what kind of response it is, perhaps nothing but a press release. A response 
that has an external locus would be lobbying Congress to delay labeling 
regulations, while an internal response would be to study the cost of 
different labeling options. An active response would be a company directly 
responding to the issue, perhaps by altering its strategy or engaging in 
advocacy advertising, while a passive response would be a committee meeting 
called to rationalize doing nothing.
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While this is not a definitive example, it should give some idea about 
what each of these components means in practice. Next, a brief discussion of 
the first two model components is made and then followed by an in-depth 
description of the last two.
Issue characteristics and interpretation context. The model has 
identified two different sets of forces having convergent and divergent 
influences, respectively, on organizational responses. In other words, the 
relationship between issue characteristics and interpretation indicates that 
since organizations are interpreting the same sets of stimuli, they will tend 
to respond in a convergent manner: their responses will be similar. The 
relationship between interpretation context and interpretation, however, 
would lead us to expect organizational responses to be very different from 
each other, since organizational contexts would be expected to differ.
Whether issue characteristics or interpretation context will have the 
more powerful influence is an empirical question beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Suffice it to say that the issue interpretation and response 
model is organizational-level, rather than issue-level, and it is anticipated 
that interpretations, and hence, responses, will measurably differ between 
organizations.
The rest of the section discusses in some detail the two components of 
Figure 1 to be empirically tested.
Issue interpretation and response assets. Issue interpretation relates 
to the array of assets an organization needs to respond to a strategic issue. 
The process of strategic issue management involves scanning, data 
interpretation, and response (Daft & Weick, 1984) and it is with a view toward 
formulating and implementing a response that SIM occurs at all (Ansoff, 
1975). If the organization did not have to respond to a strategic issue, then
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issue interpretation would be merely an academic endeavor consisting of 
exploring possible interpretations of an issue for the sake of knowledge 
alone. Since a strategic issue presses upon an organization, however, and 
demands by its potential effect on its operations, systems, and strategy that 
the organization react in some way, the interpretation of a strategic issue is 
likely to be made with an eye on what type of action is necessary.
The importance of responding to a strategic issue would affect issue 
interpretation by relating the issue to the types of assets required to respond 
to it. These "response assets" are time, information, and resources.
Time is an important consideration for organizations (Harrigan, 1985; 
Bluedom & Denhardt, 1988; Smith & Grimm, 1991) and the importance of time 
as a response asset is stressed in Ansoff (1975, 1980). Understanding a 
strategic issue, formulating a response to it, and then gathering the 
resources necessary to implement the response can be a time-consuming 
process. An organization needs to know how much time it has to do these 
things so it can respond quickly or slowly, depending on the circumstances.
Information is another critical response asset. In order for an 
effective response to be made to a strategic issue, an organization needs 
information on the state of the issue itself, what effect the issue might have 
on the organization, and what response options may be appropriate 
(Milliken, 1987, 1990). Armed with this knowledge the organization can 
confidently allocate resources to its issue response, while if it lacks this 
knowledge it needs to proceed cautiously since the risk of implementing an 
ineffective response is high.
The third response asset is resources, and these may represent 
financial resources, physical resources, managerial resources, and goodwill. 
These are the factors that will be manipulated in implementing the issue
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response. When high levels of these resources exist, it opens a much broader 
range of response options for the organization, while if they are lacking, 
then the organization's options will be constrained.
Stock assessments. These response assets are critical to the response 
stage of SIM. Organizations, therefore, will assess the stock of these assets. 
The urgency assessment estimates the stock of time available, the 
understanding assessment estimates the stock of information available, and 
the capability assessment estimates the stock of resources available.
The urgency assessment is the perceived cost of doing nothing in 
response to an issue (Miller, 1982). The higher the level of urgency, the 
more important it is for the organization to respond quickly because there is 
less time to respond (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). The urgency assessment is the 
result of assessments and attributions relating to various issue dimensions 
(Dutton, et. al., 1990). The urgency assessment is influenced by deadlines, 
anticipated issue duration (degree of stability), publicity, and locus of 
responsibility, or causality (Dutton & Duncan, 1987: 283-4). If the urgency 
assessment is low, then the organization thinks it has enough time to 
formulate and implement a response and it does not need to act immediately.
If the urgency assessment is high, then the organization thinks there is an 
insufficient amount of time to review options, discuss alternatives, and 
compare the possible impact of different responses and the organization 
must act quickly, even at the risk of taking a faulty course of action.
The understanding assessment represents the degree of issue certainty 
that exists (Milliken, 1990). This assessment is essentially a composite of 
three types of issue certainty: state, effect, and response (Milliken, 1987). 
State certainty concerns the issue itself, what it entails, and what course it 
might take. Effect certainty concerns what effect the issue might have on
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the organization. Response certainty concerns what alternative actions the 
organization can take and the effectiveness of each of the alternatives. 
Where these three types of certainty are high, the understanding assessment 
will be high, as well, and the organization thinks it has an adequate amount 
of information to respond to an issue. When any or all of these three types of 
certainty are low, however, the understanding assessment will be low. In 
this case it will be believed that the organization does not have a sufficient 
amount of information to locate and implement an effective response.
The capability assessment concerns whether sufficient resources exist 
for the organization to be able to respond effectively (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987). This involves a variety of resources. Physical resources, such as plant 
and equipment; financial resources, such as cash or unused debt capacity; 
managerial resources, representing the systems of the organization and the 
competencies and skills of its managers; market resources, such as 
distribution systems in place, and reputation; and human resources and the 
skills resident within them all represent resource areas that might be 
involved in an organization's response. These resources also relate to the 
idea of distinctive competence and strengths in the different value chain 
functions (Selznick, 1957; Porter, 1980). The stock assessment of these 
different resources is made concerning a strategic issue. That is, the 
capability assessment of one issue might be high because the organization 
has adequate stocks of the resources needed to respond to that particular 
issue, but it may be low for another issue because the organization has low 
stocks of resources needed to respond to the second issue. When the 
resources relating to a particular issue are in abundance, the capability 
assessment will be high, implying that the organization thinks it will have 
great latitude in which response alternative it decides to implement. When
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there is a low stock of these resources, however, the capability assessment 
will be low and this indicates that the organization thinks it will be restricted 
in the kinds of responses it can make, perhaps to the degree that the more 
effective responses are outside its capability.
These three stock assessments, urgency, understanding, and capability 
are all made about specific strategic issues in separately triggered strategic 
issue diagnosis episodes (Dutton, et. al., 1983; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). In 
other words, each individual strategic issue is assessed as to urgency, 
understanding, and capability. These stock assessments are affected by the 
actual stock levels pertaining to each, but are also influenced by issue 
characteristics and the interpretation context, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Issue response. The type of interpretations made about a strategic 
issue will affect the kind of response that the organization will make. While 
there are many ways to classify organizational responses (see Milburn, 
Schuler, &  Watman [1983] for one such scheme; Fink, Beak, & Taddeo [1971] 
for a more process-oriented approach), of particular interest to this study are 
magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness. Response magnitude refers to 
the extent and permanence of the response. Response immediacy refers to 
how quickly the response is implemented. Response locus refers to the area 
that the response targets for change and can vary between internal and 
external. Response activeness refers to whether the organization attempts to 
deal directly with the strategic issue or fails to address it by using various 
avoidance or coping mechanisms. These response dimensions are closely and 
logically related to the stock assessments, as will be shown below.
These four response dimensions also figure prominently in the 
interpretationist literature on organizational response. Ford (1985) 
dichotomized response strategies as either external or internal (the locus
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measure here). Ford and Baucus (1987) addressed the dimensions of 
activeness and locus in their model of adaptation to performance downturn. 
Dutton and Jackson (1987) pictured responses to strategic issues as varying 
along target (internal or external) and magnitude. Dutton and Duncan (1987) 
presented the idea of strategic momentum, and how greater amounts of 
momentum drive larger and quicker responses. The dimensions of 
magnitude and immediacy are also of interest in the literature on responses 
to competitive moves (Smith & Grimm, 1991; Smith, et. al., 1991; Chen, et. al., 
1992).
Response magnitude captures the extent to which organizational 
changes might be classified as revolutionary (Pettigrew, 1987; Miller & 
Friesen, 1982, 1983; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990). Responses that could be 
considered of large magnitude are those involving changes in many 
organizational components, changes in the interpretation system itself, or 
changes that are of a permanent, rather than a temporary, nature (Dutton, & 
Jackson, 1987). Large-magnitude responses are likely to be more costly in 
resources than small-magnitude responses.
Responses can also vary along the dimension of immediacy, or the 
amount of time elapsed between issue interpretation and the initiation of a 
response (Ansoff 1975, 1980; Smith & Grimm, 1991; Chen, et. al., 1992). 
Immediacy is lower the greater the amount of elapsed time.
Responses can also be measured along the dimension of locus, whether 
the response is internal or external (Miles, 1980; Milburn, et. al., 1983). 
Internal responses focus on altering administrative arrangements to adjust 
to the issue, such as altering organization design, changing the 
interpretation system, and instituting new programs. (Ford, 1985; Ford & 
Baucus, 1987). External responses, on the other hand, can take the form of
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domain offense, domain defense, domain creation, or domain abandonment 
(Ford, 1985; Miles, 1982; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).
The fourth dimension along which organizational responses to 
emerging strategic issues can be measured is activeness. Active responses 
are those undertaken to deal directly with the emerging issue (Ford &  Baucus, 
1987) and they consist of the internal and external responses listed above. 
Passive responses, on the other hand, do not attempt to deal with the issue 
and may include anger, denial, alterations of the importance of the issue, and 
resignation (Ford &  Baucus, 1987). Fink, et. al. (1971) characterize the first 
two phases of organizational crisis as shock and defensive retreat, and the 
actions (or inactions) of organizational decision makers during these stages, 
such as avoidance, wishful thinking, helplessness, resistance to change, or 
indifference are characteristic of passive responses.
Summary
Chapter Two started with a review of various types of issue 
management models appearing in the literature. These models tend to follow 
a three-step sequence of identification, analysis, and response. More recent 
models have tended to focus more on the link between analysis and response, 
however, as well as emphasizing the importance of context. The focus of the 
review then shifted to issue interpretation itself. While the language of the 
interpretational approach to understanding organizational environments 
will often be used, this research is firmly grounded in the perceived 
environments perspective. In their attempts to understand complex external 
environments, organizational actors respond to various issues emanating 
primarily from the external environment. Three perspectives o n 
responding to such issues were reviewed; responding to strategic issues, 
social issues, and competitor's moves.
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The chapter ended with an in-depth discussion of a model of issue 
interpretation and response that is used as the framework for this 
dissertation. Issue interpretation is influenced by the interpretational 
context and the characteristics of the issue itself. Interpretations are made 
concerning the urgency of the issue, the degree of understanding the  
organization has concerning the issue, and the capability that the 
organization has to effectively respond to the issue. These interpretations 
are related to three critical response assets, time, information, and resources, 
that are necessary for an organization to formulate and implement an issue 
response. Interpretation effects issue response and these responses can vary 
along magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness.
The interpretation-response model forms the framework from which 
the hypotheses for this dissertation are drawn, concentrating, as has been 
the case in much of the recent literature, on the link between interpretation 
and response.
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Chapter 3 - Hypotheses 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the assessments made 
during the interpretation stage, then each of the response dimensions is 
discussed in turn, where the stock assessments are related to each response 
dimension.
Relationship Between Issue Interpretation and Response
It was demonstrated that three assessments are made during the issue 
interpretation stage of the SIM process. These relate to the stock of various 
response assets, assets that will be needed to formulate and implement a 
response to a strategic issue. The urgency assessment relates to the asset of 
time, the understanding assessment relates to the asset of information, and 
the capability assessment relates to the asset of resources. These assessments 
mean more than simply measurement of a response asset and have 
implications for the kinds of responses that are needed and feasible. The 
specific relationships between interpretational assessments and response 
dimensions are included in Figure 2.
For example, a lack of time indicates an urgent situation, implying that 
a response needs to be made sooner than later. A lack of information 
indicates a low level of understanding. This means the organization will 
have a low degree of certainty as to which response is best. Further, a lack of 
resources indicates low organizational capability, meaning that the 
organization will face constraints in the kinds of responses that are feasible. 
These assessments have implications for the organization's response, and 
how the response dimensions are influenced by them is discussed next.
Response magnitude. The assessment of issue capability influences 
response magnitude. If decision makers within an organization do not 
perceive that adequate resources are on hand, then the array of
42
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All Hypothesized relationships are positive.
Figure 2 - Relationships between the Stock Assessments and Issue Response
possible response options will be constrained (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) and 
the magnitude of the response the organization does manage to enact will be 
correspondingly small. On the other hand, if capability is high, the 
organization thinks resources do exist for a response of large magnitude and 
they are more likely to be expended. Chen, et. al. (1992) found that the 
degree of difficulty (lack of capability) of responding to an issue was 
negatively related to the magnitude of reaction, measured by the number of 
responses, a finding broadly supportive of the argument made here. This 
positive relationship is pictured in Figure 2.
Response magnitude is also influenced by the understanding 
assessment. When the stock of information is low, an organization is not 
likely to perceive that a large-scale change is feasible due to the uncertainty
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involved (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). In this case the response the 
organization implements will be of smaller magnitude, suggesting a positive 
relationship between the understanding assessment and response magnitude. 
This is pictured in Figure 2.
Thus,
H I a - Capability has a significant, positive affect on 
Response Magnitude. Stock assessments o f high capability  
lead to large magnitude responses, and stock assessments o f  
low capability lead to small magnitude responses.
H lb  - Understanding has a significant, positive affect on 
Response Magnitude. Stock assessments o f  h i g h  
understanding lead to large magnitude responses, and stock 
assessments o f low understanding lead to small magnitude 
responses.
Response immediacy. When the assessment of urgency is low, an 
organization believes that it is not necessary to formulate a response quickly 
and the response, in whatever form it takes, is likely to be delayed (Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987; Webb & Weick, 1979). When the urgency assessment is high, 
however, the response will be more immediate (Ansoff, 1980). Time pressure 
and the existence of deadlines strongly influence the urgency assessment, 
and research has shown the presence of deadlines to motivate those under 
them to higher levels of exertion the closer the deadline nears (Webb & 
Weick, 1979). Hence, more urgent issues lead to more immediate responses. 
Also, MacMillan, et. al. (1985) found that banks responded more quickly to 
visible competitor product introductions than to less visible ones. Issue 
visibility influences the urgency assessment (Dutton & Duncan, 1987), and
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this finding is supportive of the positive relationship suggested here. This is 
pictured in Figure 2.
The understanding assessment also has a positive influence on 
response immediacy. When an organization has a high level of 
understanding related to an issue, it will require less time to obtain the 
information necessary to respond appropriately since it thinks it already has 
most of what it needs. MacMillan, et. al. (1985.) found that banks responded 
more quickly to competitor product introductions that were similar to their 
present products since, in that case, their level of understanding about the 
competitor's product was high. This positive relationship is pictured in 
Figure 2.
Response immediacy is also influenced by the capability assessment 
for much the same reason. When an organization believes it has the 
capability to respond to an issue then it is possible for it to enact a response 
sooner, other things being equal, than when it believes it does not have the 
capability. When capability is high, this implies that the organization does 
not need to spend any additional time acquiring more resources since it 
already believes it has them. Some empirical research tends to support this 
assertion. MacMillan, et. al. (1985) found that the ease of duplication of a 
competitor's new product introduction is positively correlated with the 
immediacy of response. Chen, et. al., (1992) found that the difficulty of 
responding was negatively correlated with the immediacy of that response. 
While alternative interpretations for these results are possible, it is 
reasonable to think that organizations would tend to have a high estimate of 
issue capability in situations where ease of duplication was high, and a low 
estimate of capability where a response would be difficult. The positive
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relationship between issue capability and immediacy is also pictured in 
Figure 2.
Thus,
H2a - Urgency has a significant, positive effect on Response 
Immediacy. Stock assessments o f high urgency lead to 
quicker, more immediate responses, and stock assessments o f 
low urgency lead to slower, less immediate responses.
H2b - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Immediacy. Stock assessments o f  h igh  
understanding lead to quicker, more immediate responses, 
and stock assessments o f low understanding lead to slower, 
less immediate responses.
H2c - Capability has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Immediacy. Stock assessments o f high capability 
lead to quicker, more immediate responses, and stock 
assessments o f low capability lead to slower, less immediate 
responses.
Response locus. The understanding assessment influences response 
locus. When understanding is low organizations are more likely to gravitate 
toward responses in areas where they have greater control (Jauch & Kraft,
1986). It can be expected that the degree of control an organization has over 
its internal operations far exceeds the control it has over its external 
environment. Although organizations may, through various means, gain 
some control of their external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
control can be exercised internally by management directive. Indeed, this 
directive role for management is at the heart of the very idea of 
"organization" (Coase, 1937). It follows, then, that when the assessment of
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understanding is low, organizations will be attracted toward internal 
responses. When there is a high perceived level of understanding, however, 
organizations are less likely to feel constrained by a lack of control and will 
implement external responses with greater frequency. Figure 2 illustrates 
this positive relationship.
The issue capability assessment is likely to have an impact on response 
locus. This is based on the assumption, mentioned above, that internal 
responses are subject to a greater level of control than external responses. 
Because of the inherent lack of control over external responses, 
organizations may face unexpected contingencies in their implementation, 
contingencies that require the expenditure of additional resources to assure 
the successful resolution of the strategic issue. Internal responses, being 
more under the control of the organization, will not be as susceptible to 
unexpected complications in their implementation and would thus not 
require the expenditure of additional resources. Low levels of capability 
indicate that the organization thinks resources for a response are lacking, 
and so organizations will prefer to implement responses where there is a 
higher degree of control. Thus, internal responses are more likely to be 
selected when the issue capability assessment is low. Where the issue 
capability assessment is high, however, the organization does not feel 
constrained by a low level of resources and so is more likely to consider 
implementing external responses. Figure 2 captures this positive 
relationship.
Thus,
H3a - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Locus. Stock assessments o f high understanding
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lead to external responses, and stock assessments o f low  
understanding lead to internal responses.
H3b - Capability has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Locus. Stock assessments o f high capability lead to 
external responses, and stock assessments o f low capability 
lead to internal responses.
Response activeness. What kinds of interpretations lead to passive 
responses? Passive responses can be expected when the level of stress is 
either very low or very high (Ford & Baucus, 1987). Where stress is very low, 
as in a case of a very slight threat or a slight to moderate opportunity, 
organizations are likely to dismiss the issue as being not important or to deny 
that it has any relevance. This type of response can appear very functional 
when the organization believes that the issue may be temporary (Weitzel &  
Jonsson, 1989).
In response to very threatening issues, where the assessment of 
urgency is high and assessments of capability and understanding are low, 
although active responses are definitely required, organizations are again 
likely to respond passively, relying more on coping behaviors than problem­
solving responses (Anderson, 1976). This passive response is somewhat 
similar to a deer staring at the headlights of an onrushing automobile and 
has been called the threat-rigidity effect (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). 
In such situations, organizations tend to restrict the flow of information and 
continue in the previous course of action. Often, organizations will escalate 
their level of commitment when such challenges to the present course of 
action exist by justifying past actions (Dutton &  Duncan, 1987), making an 
active response even less likely than before, since organizations will expend 
effort justifying the lack of change (Staw, 1981; Whyte, 1986).
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In terms of the stock assessments, when understanding is low, for 
example, higher levels of capability would not have as great of an impact on 
response activeness as when understanding is higher. In an uncertain 
situation the amount of resources would matter less to an organization than 
when understanding is high. Capability would have the same impact on 
understanding. High levels of urgency, however, would reduce the impact of 
both the understanding and capability stock assessments. These interaction 
effects would all be consistent with the threat-rigidity hypothesis. Since 
urgency has an opposite influence in interaction than that of understanding 
or capability, it will be reverse-scored for these interaction tests.
Alternatively, active responses are likely when a high level of issue 
urgency or issue knowledge exists or when an organization perceives that 
there are sufficient resources to respond. Dutton and Webster (1988) found 
that when an issue was perceived as feasible (high in both capability and 
understanding) managers tended to direct more attention to it. When issue 
understanding or issue capability is high, then, a more active response 
stance will obtain. Also, issues assessed as low in urgency are more 
appropriately dealt with through passive responses, allowing organizations 
to focus attention on more pressing concerns (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). The 
individual, positive effects of the urgency, understanding and capability 
assessments are illustrated in Figure 2.
Thus,
H4a - Urgency has a significant, positive effect on Response 
Activeness. Stock assessments o f high urgency lead to 
active, d irect responses, and stock assessments o f  low  
urgency lead to passive, indirect responses.
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H4b - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Activeness. Stock assessments o f  h igh  
understanding lead to active, direct responses, and stock 
assessments o f low understanding lead to passive, indirect 
responses.
H4c - Capability has a significant, positive effect on 
Response Activeness. Stock assessments o f high capability 
lead to active, direct responses, and stock assessments o f low 
capability lead to passive, indirect responses.
H4d - The interaction o f Understanding and Capability has a 
significant, positive effect on Response Activeness. Stock 
assessments o f high understanding strengthen the effect o f 
capability on response activeness, and stock assessments o f  
low understanding weaken the effect o f capab ility  on 
response activeness. Capability affects the relationship  
between understanding and response activeness in the same 
manner.
H4e - The interaction o f reverse-scored Urgency and 
Understanding has a significant, positive effect on Response 
Activeness. Stock assessments of high urgency weaken the 
effect o f understanding on response activeness, and stock 
assessments o f low urgency strengthen the effect o f  
understanding on response activeness. Understanding 
affects the relationship between urgency and response 
activeness in the same manner.
H 4f - The interaction o f reverse-scored Urgency and 
Capability has a significant, positive effect on Response
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Activeness. Stock assessments o f high urgency weaken the 
effect o f capability on response activeness, and stock 
assessments o f low urgency strengthen the effect o f  
capability on response activeness. Capability affects the 
relationship between urgency and response activeness in  
the same manner.
Summary
Chapter 3 contained the hypotheses tested in this dissertation. The 
effects that the three stock assessments have on the four response 
dimensions were delineated. Generally, when Urgency, Understanding, and 
Capability are high then Magnitude, Immediacy, Locus, and Activeness are 
hypothesized to be high, as well. This is reasonable because the three 
interpretation variables represent assessments of the amount of response 
assets the organization has. The higher these are, the more likely it is that 
organizations will believe that larger, faster, more external, and more direct 
responses are both possible and necessary.
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology used to test these 
hypotheses.
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Chapter 4 - Design and Procedure 
This chapter begins with an explanation of the industry, issue, and 
sample. The measures used in this dissertation are then discussed, as is the 
use of retrospective accounts, their pitfalls, and the means used to minimize 
these drawbacks. Next, the data collection procedures are discussed and the 
chapter concludes with a brief description of the analytic procedures used. 
Industry. Issue, and Sample
Milliken (1990) concluded that studying the interpretation of specific 
environmental changes was a useful way to learn about the factors that 
influence the issue interpretation process. She examined how college and 
university administrators interpreted the decrease in the number of 18-to-22 
year olds, an age group from which these institutions draw most of their 
students. The best way to test the hypotheses posited here would be to follow 
a similar approach. Thus, a specific change for one industry will be used to 
test the hypotheses. Also, by examining one issue in one industry, the 
influence of these two areas on the independent and dependent variables 
will be held constant.
The industry. The population selected for study here is the restaurant 
industry (SIC 5812). Although some definitional ambiguity exists concerning 
the types of establishments that populate this industry, "'(F)ast food' 
generally means food served to a patron at a self-service counter or through 
a drive-in window. . .  [either] prepared in advance . . .  or cooked to order . . ." 
(Emerson, 1990: 17). The view taken here is somewhat broader, including 
franchise restaurants that feature sit-down eating and service. Consisting of
160,000 individual restaurants that serve about 46 million Americans every 
day who buy an average of $250 worth of food a year (Jacobsen & Fritschner, 
1991), the fast-food industry has a major impact on American food
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consumption. Forty percent of the average American family's food budget 
goes toward eating out and most of this money is spent on fast food, which 
has increasingly come under attack for its poor nutritional value (Clark, 
1991; Breo, 1990). The economic impact of the industry is significant, with 
sales of $74 billion a year (Clark, 1991). McDonald's alone, the largest 
company in the industry, had 1990 sales of almost $19 billion in its nearly
12,000 outlets worldwide. It has been estimated that 1 out of 15 Americans 
initially entered the work force through employment at McDonald's (Love, 
1986) and this one fast-food company has a larger job-training program than 
the U.S. Army through which a broad range of work skills are taught (Clark, 
1991; Wildavsky, 1989). The restaurant industry includes numerous 
segments, such as hamburgers, chicken, pizza, Mexican, seafood, and budget 
steak houses (Emerson, 1990).
The impact of this industry on American culture has also been 
profound as it has come to represent to many the acme of American throw­
away society (Monninger, 1988). This high-visibility industry has, in turn, 
been affected by changing social attitudes in a variety of ways and has been 
the focus of various criticisms in recent years. Companies within this 
industry have been influenced by societal concerns about nutrition, the 
environment, and meaningful work, not to mention other strategic issues 
concerning demographic shifts and increasing levels of industry price 
rivalry (Clark, 1991). The presence of numerous such strategic issues in 
restaurants in recent years makes this industry a fertile area for the study of 
organizational interpretation of such issues.
The issue. The issue of the increased level of interest in nutrition is 
best suited to this research. This is for several reasons: its potential impact in 
relation to the other issues; a readily identifiable history; and a time frame
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recent enough for respondents to be able to recall critical information, yet 
long enough ago for organizations to have had time to interpret and respond 
to it. After a brief history of the issue of increased nutrition awareness, 
these reasons will be discussed in greater depth.
The issue's development began in the late 1960s when a White House 
conference on nutrition and health drew attention to widespread 
malnutrition (Clark, 1991). Such concerns lay dormant for some time. 
Americans became more health conscious in the early 1980s, however, 
demonstrating this concern through both increased physical fitness and 
better eating habits. Americans became increasingly aware of the 
deleterious effects of dietary fat and were concerned about reducing their 
intake of it (Piscatella, 1991). Since fast-food is quite high in fat, a few 
companies during this time introduced some healthier items, mainly salads 
and salad bars (Clark, 1991), but most made no changes at all. What remained 
to bring this latent issue to the forefront was an awareness of the connection 
between fat and fast food.
Phil Sokolof made this connection in the minds of the American 
public. In the spring of 1990, he ran a series of hard-hitting advertisements 
that accused fast-food companies of having too much fat in their fare (Breo,
1990). Sokolof was a successful executive who suffered a heart attack while 
still relatively young and who blamed his once high-fat diet for his poor 
health. In a matter of weeks, several large firms changed the way they 
prepared french fries, although there were denials that it had anything to do 
with the ads (Clark, 1991). Before 1990 was out, McDonald's began test 
marketing a low-fat hamburger, the McLean Deluxe, and since then other 
firms have followed with lower-fat selections of their own (Hume, 1990; 
Roberts, 1991).
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This issue has affected other areas of concern for the industry, such as 
minority relations and governmental regulation. Fast-food companies began 
to be criticized for their part in the poor nutrition of those living in the 
inner city and the issue has put them on a more defensive stance in the long- 
running battle with the Food and Drug Administration to require labeling of 
fast food products (Clark, 1991). The issue has also opened a niche for 
establishments offering a lower-fat menu to enter the restaurant industry, 
thus increasing competition (Whittemore, 1991). Fast food menus and 
organizations are likely to continue to evolve in the future in response to 
nutritional concerns, but the initial responses have been implemented and 
the industry seems to be closer to finding an equilibrium related to this issue.
The issue of increased nutritional concerns is particularly relevant to 
the fast-food portion of the restaurant industry because its food is high in 
such unhealthy food categories as saturated fat, cholesterol, and salt that are 
associated with various physical maladies such as high blood pressure, some 
forms of cancer, and heart disease (Clark, 1991). This issue, thus, strikes at 
the legitimacy of the industry in ways that public concern over excessive 
trash or low-paying, dead-end jobs do not. The potential threat to legitimacy 
increases the likelihood that companies in the industry will believe 
themselves affected by it in some way and makes it the preferred issue to 
study.
The issue of nutritional concerns related to health food is preferred 
because it also has a readily identifiable history. The issue was latent for 
much of the decade of the 1980s but erupted suddenly and noticeably in the 
spring of 1990 when Phil Sokolof ran his very pointed and aggressive 
advertisements. The issue has not gone away since, but has been sustained 
by further inquiry into the nutritional value of fast foods, including doubt
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concerning the value of newer, "healthier" items (Roberts, 1991; "Fast Food,"
1991). Thus it is easy to anchor a data-collection instrument around specific 
incidents and time periods that should serve to increase the equivalence of 
data between organizations.
The time frame also makes this issue suitable for study. The issue came 
to the forefront about three years ago, recent enough that it would be 
possible for respondents to recall crucial information, but long enough ago 
for the organization to have formulated and implemented a thorough issue 
response. This last requirement is quite important, since for the response 
dimension of immediacy to have any meaning a certain period of time must 
have elapsed. Also, responses of large magnitude and that are active might 
require more time to implement and thus would be missed if the strategic 
issue studied occurred too recently.
Thus, by focusing on how restaurant firms interpreted and responded 
to the strategic issue of increased nutrition awareness it is possible to test the 
hypotheses posited previously. A discussion of specific measures used in this 
study follows.
Measures
Interpretation variables. The data interpretation stage of the SIM 
model contains the stock assessments, involving the level of response assets 
needed to formulate and implement a response to a strategic issue. The three 
stock assessments are urgency, understanding, and capability. These involve 
assessments of the levels of time, information, and resources, respectively. 
The stock assessments were measured with Likert-scale items drawn from 
various sources. Appendix B contains a list of these scales.
Issue urgency was measured using eight items corresponding to the 
salient dimensions of an issue that lead to an assessment of urgency
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mentioned in Dutton and Duncan (1987) and Dutton, et. al. (1990). These items 
are listed in Appendix B and concern organizational responsibility, 
anticipated issue duration, time pressure, issue importance, and issue 
visibility. These eight items were summed to represent the perceived 
urgency of the issue and the reliability assessed.
Issue understanding was measured with a seven-item response 
certainty Likert-scale drawn from Milliken (1990) and, based on initial pre­
test comments, simplified for use in this study. These items appear in 
Appendix B. The reliability of this scale when used in Milliken's study was 
alpha = .75, which she considered acceptable. Response certainty represents 
a measure of the stock of the response asset of information an organization 
has and is equivalent to the understanding assessment.
Issue capability was measured two ways: globally and by its 
components. The global measure was a seven-item Likert-scale that assessed 
the overall impression of whether the organization had adequate resources 
to respond effectively to the issue of consumer nutrition awareness. These 
items are also listed in Appendix B.
Following Hofer and SchendePs (1978) and Barney's (1991) discussion 
of firm resources, the items of the component capability scale measured four 
different areas: financial resources, organizational resources, human  
resources, and technological resources. These areas are also included in 
other lists of organizational resources found in Digman (1986), Thompson 
and Strickland (1983) and Porter (1980). These scales are presented in 
Appendix B. Each of the subscales has four items, except the organizational 
one, which has five.
Response variables. Four dimensions of organizational response were 
discussed: magnitude, locus, activeness, and immediacy. Data for these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
variables were collected through the following procedure. First, a list of 
alternative responses to the strategic issue of increased nutrition awareness 
was generated. This list, as well as the whole questionnaire, appears in 
Appendix C. The appropriateness of the list as well as its breadth of coverage 
was assessed by having several experts familiar with the fast-food industry 
examine it.
A panel of experts familiar with the fast-food industry then rated each 
alternative response as to its magnitude, locus, and activeness along three 
separate four-point Likert-scales. A description of response magnitude, 
locus, and activeness was provided to each expert along with the list of 
responses. A Delphi panel approach was used to elicit two rounds of 
responses (Dalkey &  Helmer, 1963; Helmer, 1966). The median response 
scores for each variable from the second round represent the expert- 
assigned ratings. This list of possible responses was included in the mail-out 
questionnaire and respondents were asked to identify the responses their 
particular organization implemented and the approximate date of each 
response.
The scores for each organization along response magnitude, locus, and 
activeness were calculated as follows. Table 2 contains the operationalization 
of the dependent variables. Magnitude was operationalized in three different 
ways: the number of responses implemented from the list (MAGNUMBR), the 
sum of the magnitude ratings for all responses implemented (MAGRATIN), 
and the ratio large responses to small responses (LAR/SMA). Locus was 
operationalized in two ways: the ratio of external responses implemented to 
internal responses implemented (EXT/INT) and the number of external 
responses implemented (EXTNUMBR). Activeness was also operationalized in 
two ways: the ratio of active responses implemented to passive responses
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implemented (ACT/PAS) and the number of active responses implemented 
(ACTNUMBR). In cases where more than one respondent replied for an 
organization, the scores from different respondents were averaged to obtain 
the final variable values.
Table 2 - Operationalization of the Dependent Variables
Magnitude
MAGNUMBR - the number of implemented responses
MAGRATIN - the sum of the magnitude ratings of the implemented 
responses
LAR/SMA - the ratio of large implemented responses to small implemented 
responses
Immediacy
IMMYEAR - the year of the initial implemented responses minus 1990 
Locus
EXT/INT - the ratio of external implemented responses to internal 
implemented responses
EXTNUMBR - the number of external implemented responses 
Activeness
ACT/PAS - the ratio or active implemented responses to passive 
implemented responses
ACTNUMBR - the number of active implemented responses
These multiple operationalizations were used due to the various ways 
of defining each one. This approach increases confidence in the content 
validity of these measures. This multidimensional approach can also indicate 
how robust are the results. Furthermore, since these dimensions have not 
often been operationalized in the past, there is very little previous research
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to indicate which specific measure would be the best to use. How the 
multidimensional nature of these constructs was captured is discussed next.
Response variable operationalization. Each of the three magnitude 
measures captures a slightly different aspect of this construct. An  
organization might respond to a response in a large way by implementing 
more responses to a strategic issue as opposed to fewer. This view of 
magnitude is captured by counting the number of responses (MAGNUMBR). 
Alternatively, an organization that implemented a few large responses 
instead of numerous small responses could be said to have responded in a 
large manner. Summing the magnitude ratings for all responses 
implemented captures this aspect (MAGRATIN). Finally, if many of the 
responses implemented were of significant magnitude, the organization 
could be said to have had a large response set. Measuring the ratio of large 
responses to small captures this aspect (LAR/SMA).
Response locus also has various dimensions, two of which are 
addressed in the measures used here. The ratio of external responses to 
internal ones (EXT/INT) indicates the tendency of an organization to focus its 
attention outside itself in dealing with a strategic issue. If an organization 
implements only two responses, however, and one is external, but another 
organization implements ten responses, three of which are external, EXT/INT 
does not adequately capture the fact that the second organization 
implemented three times the number of external responses. This aspect of 
locus is captured by measuring the absolute number of external responses 
(EXTNUMBR).
Similar logic applies to the activeness measures. The ratio of active to 
passive responses (ACT/PAS) indicates the tendency of an organization to 
implement responses that directly addressed the strategic issue. It is
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necessary to measure the absolute number of active responses (ACTNUMBR), 
as well, to take into account cases where an organization implemented many 
responses, only a few of which are active, as opposed to another organization 
that only implemented one response, which was active. ACT/PAS would rate 
the latter firm as having a more active set of responses while ACTNUMBR 
would rate the first firm as more active.
It is necessary to consider the organization's responses as a whole due 
to the organizational level of analysis. This means that multiple responses, 
while perhaps being discrete events, all form part of the response-set an 
organization puts in place vis-a-vis a strategic issue. The measures above 
reflect this consideration.
Response immediacy was measured in two ways: (1) the year of the 
first response the company took minus 1990 (IMMYEAR), and (2) IMMYEAR 
multiplied by twelve plus the month (1 for January, 2 for February, etc.) 
(1MMONTH). The first measure is the number of years between 1990 and the 
date of the first response, while the second is the number of months between 
January 1990 and the month of the first response mentioned. IMMYEAR is 
somewhat coarse-grained while IMMONTH is more fine-grained. The first 
measure was necessary because, while almost all the respondents could recall 
the year that a response was taken, not all of them could recall the month. In 
the cases of companies with multiple respondents, the earliest date 
mentioned by any  of the respondents is the one used. These measures 
indicate how quickly it took the organization to initially respond.
Use of retrospective accounts. The use of retrospective accounts as 
data sources in strategy research has been the subject of investigation 
(Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985; Huber & Power, 1985). The consensus of this 
research is that while there can be limitations with such data, there are
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instances where it must be used and it can be collected in such a way as to 
minimize problems with it.
This research relies on such data heavily. Sources other than  
retrospective accounts may contain information on some of the variables to 
be included in this research, but the interpretational variables are 
perceptual in nature and can only be measured by asking organizational 
participants as to their recollections. Thus, retrospective accounts must be 
used.
There are various biases involved in the use retrospective accounts 
such as hindsight bias, attribution errors, cognitive limitations, and social 
desirability (Huber &  Power, 1985; Schwenk, 1985). Golden (1992) found that 
CEOs were not able to reliably recall organizational strategy after a two-year 
interval when compared with how they had assessed that strategy two years 
earlier. While this result may have been due to the nature of the collection 
instrument (single-item measures of strategy have been criticized on 
reliability grounds [Zahra & Pearce, 1990]), it does indicate that such data 
should be collected with care and used with caution. These authors have, 
however, recommended ways to minimize these problems. A brief discussion 
follows of seven of those techniques used here.
(1) Including explanations of questionnaire sub-scales that legitimate 
responses of either extreme can be one way to motivate respondents to 
provide accurate information and can reduce social desirability bias in some 
instances (Golden, 1992; Sheatsley, 1983). Such an explanation was included 
at the beginning of the independent variable subsection where social 
desirability might be a problem.
(2) Organizational respondents are also more likely to provide 
information if, to the extent possible, confidentiality and anonymity are
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maintained (Huber & Power, 1985). The cover letter that was mailed with 
each questionnaire assured the respondent of the confidentiality of the data. 
Appendix D contains a copy of the letter that was used.
(3) Executive-level people are less likely to fill out questionnaires that 
require a significant time commitment (Huber & Power, 1985), and 
researchers are encouraged to be frank about this. A reliable time estimate 
was made during the pre-test (twenty minutes) and included in the cover 
letter (in Appendix D).
(4) Executives are more likely to show interest in providing 
information if doing so can be viewed in a useful light (Kincaid & Bright, 
1957). Following Huber and Power (1985), the cover letter stressed the 
usefulness and importance of this research.
(5) Retrospective accounts of perceptions are particularly prone to 
bias when compared to recollections of facts (Golden, 1992). One way to assist 
respondents in accessing subjective information correctly is to ask several 
factual questions related to the period the questionnaire involves. This can 
increase the salience of that period for the respondent (Boeker, 1989). 
Several questions involving such information were included at the 
beginning of the respondent questionnaire, page one of which appears in 
Appendix E.
(6) Since different individuals are likely to recall events differently, it 
is advisable to ask multiple respondents familiar with a single situation 
(Schwenk, 1985). Perceptions of organizational phenomena are likely to 
differ between individuals for all kinds of reasons (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), 
and responses from one person may tend to offset the recollection biases of 
another. Multiple questionnaires were sent to different individuals in each 
organization in an attempt to obtain multiple responses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
(7) Finally, many respondents do not prefer a structured format like 
the respondent questionnaire followed. Huber and Power (1985) recommend 
encouraging respondents to comment or elaborate on their answers to the 
Likert-format questions. Instructions telling respondents to feel free to do 
this were included in the questionnaire.
These techniques will not eliminate all the problems with data derived 
from retrospective accounts, but should serve to attenuate some of them. 
Collection Procedures
Pre-test. The organizational informant questionnaire was pre-tested 
twice. The initial test was by distribution to MBA students and recent MBA 
graduates of a small, deep-south, private college. The institution offers an 
MBA in executive leadership, and has attracted students with extensive 
experience in business and the public sector. A brief case study about one 
fast-food restaurant's response to the issue of nutrition was included with the 
questionnaire (n = 20). Comments were requested concerning the 
understandability of the instructions and of the questionnaire items.
Of the twenty respondents, thirteen provided information on the 
amount of their past work experience. On average, these thirteen 
respondents had 14 years of work experience. Five of the thirteen had 
managerial experience, as well. These five averaged almost 13 years of 
experience as a manager. Their backgrounds were wide-ranging, including 
engineering, business administration, information systems, accounting, 
finance, and government relations. None of them appeared to have 
experience in the restaurant industry, however, and so, after the 
questionnaire was altered, a second pre-test using a sample of restaurant 
managers and executives was performed.
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The scales for the variables Urgency, Understanding, and Capability 
(global) all had alphas of greater than .64, and after some item trimming 
(Carmines &  Zeller, 1979) the reliabilities ranged from .69 to .78. This was 
considered to be very good, since two of these scales were developed for this 
research. Never the less, some of the trimmed items were re-worded, and 
items were added to the Urgency and Capability (global) scales to improve 
future reliability.
The reliability of the subscales of the Capability (component) variable 
was also assessed, and three of them, Financial, Human, and Organizational 
had good reliabilities ranging from .72 to .87. The Technological subscale 
only had a reliability of .36 and so was changed by keeping the two items that 
had the highest inter-correlation and rewording the other two.
A second pre-test was then conducted using the modified 
questionnaire. Questionnaires were distributed to top management 
personnel of restaurants in a moderately large, southern city (twelve usable 
responses were received). Results from this second pre-test indicated the 
favorable impact of the previously discussed changes.
The alphas for the Urgency, Understanding, and Capability (global) 
scales ranged from .72 to .88. Ironically, the two new scales, Urgency and 
Capability (alphas = .88 & .86 respectively), performed better than did the 
Understanding scale (alpha = .72), which was based on Milliken (1990). The 
Understanding scale's reliability was still considered adequate, however.
The Capability (component) subscales performed even better, with 
alphas ranging from .79 (for Human) to .97 (for Financial). The 
Organizational subscale had an alpha of .89, while the Technology subscale 
had an alpha of .90, which was much improved. These reliabilities were
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higher than expected, since each of these subscales had been developed for 
this research.
No changes were made because these results were very good. The 
generally higher reliabilities were due to the changes made based on the 
first pre-test, as well as the use of actual restaurant managers who were more 
intimately familiar with the issues in question than the MBA students were.
The expert panel questionnaire was pre-tested on a set of four 
individuals, two who were familiar with the restaurant industry through 
work experience, and two others who had academic qualifications in the 
management area, as well as extensive work experience. Changes were made 
to the expert panel questionnaire based on their recommendations and on 
the recommendations of faculty colleagues who examined it. Some comments 
indicated that the definitions for magnitude, activeness, and locus were too 
brief, and these were lengthened and examples added. Also, the terms 
"activeness" and "locus" were changed on the questionnaire to 
"responsiveness" and "focus" to make these constructs easier to comprehend. 
(The original wording will be used in this paper, however.)
Population and sample. The population of interest is restaurants listed 
in the SIC code of 5812 -- Eating Places, that were in existence for at least a 
year before the spring of 1990 when Phil Sokolof ran his attention-grabbing 
advertisements and forced the issue of nutrition to the forefront. 
Organizations started after the spring of 1990 were not in existence to have 
been able to respond to this issue (although their existence may have been a 
response to the issue). Although the one-year time limit is somewhat 
arbitrary, organizations that were not in existence for at least a year before 
the issue strongly emerged were still going through the difficulties of start­
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up quite unconnected to the issue of nutrition and would provide very noisy 
data.
The sample was drawn from several sources. The basic criterion for 
including a company in the sample was whether information could be found 
listing the names and positions of executives of the firms in question. 
Initially, a list of franchise restaurants was collected from the January 1993 
issue of Entrepreneur magazine, which publishes a list of franchise 
organizations every January. The 1993 Entrepreneur list includes 216 
different establishments under its "fast-food" category and 65 under its 
"restaurant" category, yielding a total of 281 potential respondent firms. This 
list was supplemented by The Franchise Source Book (Bond & Bond, 1993) 
which contained information on restaurant firms.
These companies were sent a letter requesting a copy of their UFOC 
(Uniform Franchise Offering Circular). The UFOC is a document that 
companies selling franchises are required to supply to prospective 
franchisees. It is generally a very lengthy document, which contains 
information on all aspects of the company, including a listing of the top 
managers along with their job titles and work experience. Sixty-one 
companies responded by sending their UFOCs, a low response rate explained 
by the size of these documents: it can be expensive to mail to everyone 
requesting a copy. For this reason, many of these companies only send UFOCs 
to individuals or companies that can demonstrate a significant interest in 
buying a franchise.
Since this list of companies was clearly inadequate in size, and since it 
only contained companies that franchise, alternative sources were consulted. 
Two reference works, The Directory of Corporate Affiliations: Who Owns Who. 
and Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives.
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were consulted. These contain information on the identity and background 
of corporate executives and officers of both publicly traded and privately 
held companies or their subsidiaries. Standard & Poor's Register also 
contains information on executive tenure and so is useful in determining 
which executives were employed by the company at the time in question.
Next, executive-level individuals were identified who were with the 
company at the beginning of 1990 and who were also involved with the SIM 
system or the nutrition awareness issue in some fashion. Although in many 
cases the list of executives limited the amount of choice that was possible, the 
relevant job titles were public affairs, planning, market research or market 
communications (Lenz & Engledow, 1986). To this list of positions involved 
with the SIM system can be added those with overall responsibility, such as 
president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief 
information officer. Corporate officers were also considered to be possible 
informants, due to their awareness of the strategic decisions and responses 
made by the firm. These individuals ought to be familiar with the nutrition 
issue and the responses that their organization implemented. One thousand 
six hundred eighteen names were collected from 461 different restaurant 
companies.
Data collection. Once the list of names and addresses of the 
organizational informants was collected, a copy of the pre-tested 
questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the research and requesting 
cooperation, and a self-addressed stamped envelope were mailed to each 
individual. Questionnaires were mailed to several individuals in each 
organization, increasing the likelihood that at least one response would be 
obtained from each company. This procedure was necessary since
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individuals may be less likely to return questionnaires addressing issues 
several years old.
The ideal would be to have several respondents from . each 
organization. Data from "single-respondent" organizations, however, should 
still have adequate reliability because of the shared meanings, 
understandings and belief systems present in organizations, particularly at 
higher levels (Smircich, 1983; Walsh & Fahey, 1986; Ginsberg, 1990). Also, 
those who were interested enough in the nutrition issue to complete and 
return a questionnaire would probably have had intimate involvement with 
the organization's interpretation of it or response to it and should have been 
knowledgeable as to the particulars of their company's activities.
The data for the response measures (the dependent variables) were 
collected from the expert panel. This panel had two individuals familiar with 
business management in the restaurant industry, and two individuals 
familiar with business management through academic experience. (These 
were different individuals than those used in the pre-test.) The expert- 
assigned ratings were used to determine the degree of magnitude, locus, and 
activeness present in each organization's set of responses.
Analysis Procedures
Multiple regression analysis is the appropriate technique for testing 
the hypotheses. Regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is 
quantitative and the independent variables are either quantitative or 
categorical (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). For example, response locus 
(dependent variable) is associated with more than one predictor variable, 
these being issue capability and understanding. In this case, the partial 
regression coefficient of issue capability reflects the partial effect o f 
capability on response locus while the effect of the other independent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
variable held constant (Neter, et. al., 1985: 229). The dependent variables are 
the issue response dimensions (Magnitude, Locus, Activeness, and 
Immediacy) and the independent variables are the stock assessments 
(Urgency, Understanding, Capability).
Hypotheses 4d through 4f were tested by examining interaction terms 
between the different independent variables (for example, Urgency X 
Understanding). In this case, the three independent variables would be 
entered together, followed by the square terms of the variables in the 
interaction terms (following Venkatraman [1989] and Cortina [1993]), with 
the interaction terms being entered last. In this hierarchical regression 
procedure (Cohen &  Cohen, 1983) the interaction term is only considered to 
be significant if it can explain a statistically significant amount of variance 
in the dependent variable beyond that explained by the variables entered in 
the previous two steps.
Summary
Chapter 4 included the methodology used in this dissertation. The 
restaurant industry was selected due to its ubiquity in American life and its 
consequent visibility and susceptibility to various strategic issues. The 
strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness was selected for study 
because of its readily identifiable history, timing, and salience to the 
restaurant industry. The measures used in this study was then presented. 
Data for the independent, interpretation, variables were collected by 
questionnaires mailed to executives at restaurants. Response Capability was 
measured two ways, globally and by its components. Data for the dependent, 
response, variables were collected from these executives, as well, but 
calculated using information from an expert panel that rated each response 
along three of the four response dimensions. Due to the various ways of
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conceptualizing the response variables, each of them was measured in 
various ways.
Due to the nature of the topic under investigation, retrospective data 
was collected. While there are difficulties with using this kind of data, the 
problems with it can be minimized through certain methodological 
techniques which were discussed. The questionnaire was pre-tested twice, 
and the measures were found to have acceptable levels of reliability. The 
steps taken to collect the names of executives were then identified. Multiple 
regression was used to test the hypotheses, it being the appropriate analytic 
technique for the kind of data collected.
Chapter 5 addresses the analysis of the results.
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Chapter 5 - Analysis and Results 
This chapter begins with discussions of the variable measures and the 
response rate and statistical power of the tests. Then, the results of the 
regression equations are presented. This chapter concludes by briefly 
reviewing the findings and determining to what degree the hypotheses were 
supported.
Research Variables
Independent variables. Questionnaires were mailed to executive-level 
managers in 461 companies in the eating places (SIC 5812) industry. One 
hundred nine usable responses were received from eighty-eight companies 
for an organization-level response rate of almost 19%. This is somewhat low 
compared to the response rates of 38.5% in Thomas, et. al. (1993) and of 27% 
in Greening and Gray (1994), both of which addressed similar issues and used 
mail-out questionnaires. This may be due to the retrospective nature of the 
questionnaire. Questionnaires involving events in the past are less likely to 
be returned and given this, 19% is a reasonably good response rate (D. J. 
Power, personal communication, May 9, 1994). Never the less, this raises the 
issue of respondent bias, and this is addressed in a section below.
The job titles (level in the hierarchy) and functional areas of the 
respondents are listed in Table 3. Given the small size of many restaurant 
organizations, some of the job titles (supervisor, director of . . ., etc.) are at 
high positions in the organizational hierarchy even though they may not 
sound like it. The large proportion of respondents in the areas closely 
related to responding to the nutrition issue (Operations, Marketing, Food & 
Beverage, Research &  Development) indicates that the majority of responses 
were received from individuals closely involved with the day-to-day
72
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Table 3 - Respondents' Level in the Hierarchy and 
Functional Area
Level In Hierarchy fbv Title) Number
Chairman, Board Member 5
President 14
Chief Executive Officer 14
Chief Officer 4
Senior Vice President 7
Executive Vice President 6
Vice President 22
Director o f . . .  23
Manager/Supervisor 14
Staff 5
Functional Area Number
Top Level (General) 21
Operations 18
Marketing 13
Franchising 9
Food & Beverage 8
Research & Development 8
Finance 6
Purchasing/Distribution 5
Human Resources 4
Law 1
Note - Totals do not sum to 109 because of missing 
data on some questionnaires.
activities of their respective firms and would be familiar with their 
responses to the nutrition issue.
The questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first section 
contained general questions designed to help the respondents recall events 
of several years ago. The second section contained items for the independent 
variable scales: Urgency, Understanding, and Capability. These variables 
were operationalized by summing the items for each respective scale. The 
third section contained items designed to measure capability by assessing its
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components. The components assessed were human resources, 
organizational resources, financial resources, and technological resources. 
These variables were operationalized by summing the items in their 
respective scales, as well. The fourth section was designed to gather data on 
the dependent variables and is discussed below.
Reliability and scale assessment. The inter-item reliability of the issue 
assessment scales in the organizational informant questionnaire was assessed 
by Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951) as recommended by Venkatraman and 
Grant (1986). Alpha coefficients much below alpha = .7 indicate a possible 
problem with a scale, that being the standard cutoff for adequate reliability 
in exploratory settings, while alpha = .8 is suggested for theory testing 
(Nunnally, 1978). Given the newness of the scales employed, the lower 
hurdle is deemed to be the more appropriate one. Table 4 contains the 
reliability coefficients for the independent variables.
As can be readily seen, the reliability coefficients for all the scales 
except Understanding meet or exceed the alpha = .70 guidelines suggested by 
Nunnally (1978) (and Understanding is close), and thus exhibited good 
psychometric properties. Initially, the Understanding scale had 7 items, but 
one item had negative, although slight, correlations with two other scale 
items. For this reason, the item was dropped to reduce the noise in the 
measure (Carmines &  Zeller, 1979). Trimming this item improved the scale's 
reliability marginally. Understanding was close enough to the alpha = .70 
hurdle that it was still included in this study but since this scale did not meet 
the alpha = .70 hurdle, the results obtained by using it should be interpreted 
with caution. This scale also exhibited lower reliability than the others in 
the pre-tests.
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Dependent variables. A panel of six experts, four individuals familiar 
with the restaurant industry through work experience and two individuals 
familiar with academic management, was formed. The expert questionnaire 
consisted of the same list of possible restaurant responses that was included 
in the restaurant respondent questionnaire. The experts were asked to rate 
each possible response as to its degree of magnitude, locus (higher ratings 
indicated a more external locus), and activeness.
Table 4 - Reliability Analysis for the 
Independent Variables
Scale Name Items in Scale Alpha Coefficient
Urgency 8 .83
Understanding 6 .67
Capability (Global) 7 .88
Finance 4 .90
Organization 5 .81
Human 3 .73
Technology 4 .82
Capability (Component) 16 .90
Two rounds were conducted. One industry expert failed to return a 
completed questionnaire in the first round and was dropped. This left the 
final panel with three industry experts and the two academic experts. At the 
end of the first round, median responses were calculated (following the 
procedure in Dalkey & Hclmer [1963]) and these were indicated on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
questionnaires that were sent out for the second round. The experts were 
advised to complete the questionnaire again, taking into account both the 
median rating and their initial rating. The median rating was taken again 
for each item and this value was used in subsequent analysis.
Of the five questionnaires that were returned at the end of the second 
round, only four were used to calculate the final median values. The fifth 
questionnaire was returned quite late and exhibited a large number of 
"irrational responses." In a Delphi panel, experts give an initial opinion that 
is followed by additional rounds where they can modify this opinion by 
taking into account the opinions of the other panel members. An expert 
using the information available to them would tend to alter his or her initial 
assessment in the direction of the group median or mean. An individual who 
lowers their rating of magnitude, for example, when the group median was 
higher than their initial estimate is probably not using the information 
provided to them in a "rational" or anticipated manner. An additional 
instance would be an initially low rating being raised not only to the group 
median, but past it (a 1 becoming a 3 when the group median was 2, for 
example).
The fifth expert demonstrated an unusually high tendency to answer 
in this fashion. In fact, this individual answered in this "odd" manner more 
times than the other four experts combined, 42 versus 41. Also, the faculty 
member who was the contact person for these experts had suspicions that the 
fifth expert did not actually complete the questionnaire himself the second 
time. The faculty member reached this conclusion based on his knowledge of 
some difficulties that the fifth expert was going through at the time 
concerning bankruptcy and starting a new business. Since this would seem 
to significantly increase the amount of noise in the measure (the ratio of the
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subjective component of the measure to the objective component [Reaves,
1992]), this individual's questionnaire was not included in the calculation of 
the final expert panel medians.
Using these expert-derived values, the dependent variables 
(magnitude, locus, and activeness) were constructed as follows. The fourth 
section of the questionnaire mailed to restaurant executives contained a list 
of possible responses that their respective organizations could have taken. 
They were asked to indicate which responses they had implemented and the 
month and year they had started each one. Appendix F contains the number 
of companies in the sample that implemented each of the 38 responses on the 
list. A close examination of this appendix will reveal that every response 
listed was implemented by at least one company, indicating the items on the 
list were quite relevant to restaurants responding to the nutrition awareness 
issue.
The different operationalizations of Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness 
were measured as follows. Each response on the list of 38 responses was 
assigned three ratings: the expert median score for magnitude, locus, and 
activeness. If the median rating for a response was a 1 or 2, that response 
was classified as either small, internal, or passive, depending on the purpose 
of that rating. If the median rating for a response was a 3 or 4, that response 
was classified as either large, external, or active, depending on what that 
rating was for. If the median rating was 2.5, the response was not classified 
since 2.5 represented the exact midpoint between a rating of 1 (very small, 
for example) and a rating of 4 (very large). Measured in this way, a response 
might be large but passive, active but internal, and so on. Appendix G 
contains a listing of how many of the 38 responses were classified large 
versus small, external versus internal, and active versus passive.
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A significant proportion of the responses were not classified because 
their ratings were 2.5. A mean rating of 2.5 indicated that the experts were 
quite evenly divided on the nature of a particular aspect of the focal 
response. The omissions of such responses assured that only responses seen 
as unambiguously large, or external, or active, for example, were included in 
the calculation of these variables. This strengthens the validity of these 
measures.
Magnitude was operationalized in three ways: 1) the number of 
responses implemented (MAGNUMBR); 2) the sum of the expert magnitude 
medians for all responses that were implemented (MAGRATIN); and 3) the 
ratio of the number of large responses implemented to the number of small 
responses (LAR/SMA). Locus and Activeness were each operationalized in 
two identical ways: 1 ) the ratio of the number of external (or active) 
responses to the number of internal (or passive) responses (EXT/INT and 
ACT/PAS, respectively); and 2) the number of external (or active) responses 
implemented (EXTNUMBR and ACTNUMBR, respectively).
Other operationalizations of Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness were 
attempted, but were not included because of severe residual term non 
normality. For the three dependent variables mentioned above, the average 
magnitude, locus, and activeness ratings were calculated for each company. 
All three of these measures were negatively skewed (skewness coefficients of 
-2.03, -1.89, and -2.04, respectively) and extremely peaked (kurtosis 
coefficients of 3.47, 3.21, and 3.34, respectively). Residual analysis of the 
regressions using these average measures as dependent variables exhibited a 
very non normal residual pattern. To salvage these measures and allow them 
to still be used, a Box-Cox transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) was employed to 
identify the optimum power transformation to employ on the dependent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
variables. Fifth- and sixth-order power transformations were required to 
minimize the error sum of squares, the Box-Cox selection criterion. Since 
interpretation of power transformations on this order can be problematic, 
and since other, more suitable, operationalizations of these three dependent 
variables were employed, the results involving these variables were not 
reported.
Immediacy, the fourth dependent variable, was operationalized 
independently of the expert ratings in two ways. First, the number 1990 was 
subtracted from the year of the first response the organization implemented 
(IMMYEAR). If they implemented no responses, the year of response was set 
to 1995. Second, the identical procedure was used but was denominated in 
months and not years (IMMONTH). The results did not differ whether years 
or months were used, and so only one set of results for the different 
operationalizations was reported, those using years (IMMYEAR).
Response rate and statistical power. One hundred nine questionnaires 
were returned from individuals in 89 different companies. This was after a 
significant follow-up effort was implemented. A follow-up letter was mailed 
to each potential respondent two weeks after the questionnaires were mailed. 
Several weeks after that, an effort was made to call all the potential 
respondents who had not yet returned a questionnaire. Then, several weeks 
later, those executives who indicated that they would try to return a 
questionnaire were called again.
Given the organizational level of analysis, the effective sample size for 
determining statistical power is 89. Power considerations have traditionally 
been overlooked in strategic management research and Mazen, Hemassi, and 
Lewis (1987) recommend that these issues be addressed a priori. Power 
calculations were made before sending out the questionnaires to determine
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the number of responses needed for good statistical power. Cohen (1977) was 
used as a guide, and the chance of a type I error (incorrectly concluding 
statistical significance) was set at alpha = .05. The chance of a type II error 
(incorrectly concluding statistical non significance) should be four times as 
great, beta = .20 (Mazen, et. al., 1987). The target statistical power is then (1 - 
beta) = .80. The necessary sample size was computed using this desired level 
of statistical power, assuming a medium effect size (meaning an anticipated 
r-square statistic in the teens), and taking into account the number of 
independent variables in the regression equations. Using the regression 
equation with the most independent variables (dependent variable = 
response activeness: six independent variables), the required sample size was 
approximately n = 115. Given that most of the R-squares of the regression 
were in the twenties (hence the effects are somewhat stronger than what 
Mazen, et. al. (1987) termed "medium"), being 26 short of 115 should not 
represent a severe power problem. Low statistical power means that chances 
of Type II errors (incorrectly concluding statistical non significance) would 
be enhanced. The frequency of significant relationships in the regression 
analyses would indicate that the merely marginal statistical power of the 
tests did not cause this to happen very frequently.
Response bias. Given the somewhat anemic response rate (19%), it is 
important to check for response bias. In other words, is the sample included 
in this study representative of the restaurants to which questionnaires were 
sent? Data on three important variables, size (measured in number of units), 
sales (in millions of dollars) and restaurant type (fast food versus non-fast 
food) were gathered from the 1991 Directory of Chain Restaurant Operators. 
The most relevant size measure for restaurants is number of outlets, since 
this measure, more than sales or profits, would indicate the visibility of such
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a restaurant to publicity and notoriety related to the nutrition issue. Never­
theless, sales was also included, as was restaurant type, in order to examine 
potential sample nonrepresentativeness along several important dimensions.
Data for these variables was collected on only 71 responding firms and 
175 nonresponding firms because data on the other firms was not in the 
Directory. There were no significant differences between respondent and 
nonrespondent firms on any of the three dimensions. Responding firms 
were slightly smaller (373 units versus 477 units) than nonresponding firms 
and also had lower sales ($252 M versus $503 M). Neither of these differences 
was significant, however (t-values were .567 and 1.169, respectively). Forty- 
six percent of the responding firms were fast food, while only 39% of the 
nonresponding firms were, but this was not a significant difference, either 
(t-value = .986). Thus, the sample seems to be representative.
Results
The correlations of both the interpretation and response variables are 
contained in Tables 5 through 7, along with the mean and standard deviation 
of each. Table 5 contains the descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables. Table 6  contains the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables. Table 7 contains the correlations between the independent and 
dependent variables.
As can be readily determined, the correlations between the response 
variables are, with the exception of IMMONTH and IMMYEAR, highly 
correlated with each other. Responses that were large in magnitude also 
seemed to be external in focus as well as very active. This coherence 
between these variables is not unexpected but the magnitude of the 
correlations is notable. The immediacy variables exhibit negative 
correlations because earlier responses are scaled lower than later responses.
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Those companies that had early responses also tended to have large, external, 
and active response sets.
Urgency is highly, positively correlated with all the response 
variables, a result that will be shown to be robust in the regression 
discussion to follow. Capability and Understanding are highly correlated, 
which was expected, given that Dutton and Duncan (1987) presented these 
two assessments as parts of feasibility. The positive correlation is 
interesting, in a way, given that Understanding and Capability usually had 
different signs in the regression equations. Tolerances for the regression 
equations were well within acceptable limits on these two variables so this 
result was probably not due to multicollinearity.
Understanding was negatively correlated with most of the response 
variables, a result opposite of what was expected. Although not statistically 
significant here, they become so in the regression equations. Capability was 
positively correlated with most of the response variables.
The global measure of Capability was positively correlated with the 
four Capability component measures, which was to be expected. They also 
were significantly correlated with each other. These significant 
correlations may have caused a problem with multicollinearity in the 
regressions but the tolerances were within acceptable limits on these 
variables (from .32 to .80). The strong correlation between Technology and 
Organization is interesting given that these two variables often exhibited 
different signs, and significantly so, in the regressions. Without exception, 
these were the only two component variables that were correlated with any 
of the response variables. The two component measures not correlated with 
each other were Finance and Human.
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Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics 
Independent Variables
Mean S Dev 1 2 3 4 5
1 . Urgency 25.92 5.60
2 . Understanding 16.27 3.58 .116
3. Capability 24.30 5.88 .239* .422***
4. Technology 13.83 3.42 .233* .213* .379***
5. Human 11.82 2.29 .095 .157 .350*** .568***
6 . Organization 18.42 3.84 .1801 .146 4 3 4 *** .659*** .754***
7. Finance 12.79 4.51 .071 .033 .309** 3 6 9 *** .132
Note - All significance tests are two-tailed. 
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
6
.348***
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Table 6  - Descriptive Statistics 
Dependant Variables
Mean S Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. MAGNUMBR 9.77 5.76
2. MAGRATIN 19.84 13.12 .996***
3. LAR/SMA .06 .05 .871*** .894***
4. IMMYEAR -.61 2.92 .409*** .409*** -.290**
5. IMMONTH -1.76 34.77 -.413*** .412*** -.296** .997***
6 . EXT/INT .1 2 .1 2 .915*** .915*** .844*** .400*** .409***
7. EXTNUMBR 3.31 2 .6 8 .935*** .935*** .825*** .424*** .433*** .984***
8 . ACT/PAS .2 1 .16 .973*** .973*** .906*** .363*** .368*** .911*** .914***
9. ACTNUMBR 5.54 3.55 .967*** .967*** .864*** .361*** .365*** .855*** .8 8 8 ***
Note
* * *
* *
★
• All significance tests are two-tailed.
- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
8
.976***
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Table 7 - Correlations Between Dependant and Independent Variables
Urgency Understanding Capablity Technology Human Organization Finani
1. MAGNUMBR .408*** -.064 .229* .225* .138 .046 -.080
2. MAGRATIN .406*** -.065 .229* .224* .143 .043 -.090
3. LAR/SMA .298** .033 .248* .215* .093 .004 -.116
4. IMMYEAR -.141 -.126 -.070 -.006 -.115 -.003 .079
5. IMMONTH -.139 -.118 -.080 .004 -.106 .005 .071
6 . EXT/INT .345*** -.093 .180t .215* .147 .065 -.057
7. EXTNUMBR .394*** -.062 •187f .204t .133 .068 -.060
8 . ACT/PAS .409*** -.091 .240* .197f .129 .007 -.114
9. ACTNUMBR .421*** -.081 .216* .176 .107 -.003 -.114
Note - All significance tests are two-tailed.
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
8?
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The results of the regression equations are contained in Tables 7 
through 14. Each table contains two different models for each dependent 
variable. Model 1 is a hierarchical, polynomial, moderated regression model 
including the stock assessments of Urgency, Understanding, and Capability; 
the three squared terms, and the three interaction terms.
Hierarchical regression methodology allows the effects of additional 
independent variables on the dependent variable to be assessed after the 
effects of an initial independent variable or variables have been previously 
assessed and held constant. It is so named because independent variables, or 
sets of variables, are entered in a hierarchy through different steps. A 
special statistic, A R-square, is calculated which identifies the additional 
explanatory contribution attributable to the new variable or variables. If 
not statistically significant, A R-square indicates that the additional 
independent variables do not add sufficient explanatory power to the model 
to warrant their inclusion or the interpretation of their effects.
The regression is also in a polynomial form because it contains 
squared terms. After the stock assessment variables are entered in the first 
level of the hierarchy, the squares of these three terms are entered in the 
second level as a precondition for testing interactions effects. This second 
step is necessary to hold constant any nonlinear effects that may bias the 
interaction terms (Cortina, 1993). It also determines if the relationship of the 
stock assessments with the dependent variables is curvilinear in nature. 
Significant t-values for these squared terms indicate the presence of such 
curvilinearity.
The moderated nature of the regression model comes from testing 
interactions between the stock assessments. Significant, positive effects 
indicate that the effect of one independent variable in the interaction is
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strengthened by high levels of the other variable and weakened by low 
levels. Significant, negative effects indicate an opposite effect. All 
interactions are hypothesized to be positive.
To reiterate, the variables were entered into the first model in three 
steps. In Step 1 the three stock assessments were entered. In Step 2 the three 
squared terms were entered. In Step 3 the three interaction terms were 
entered in two different ways. First, all three interaction terms were entered 
as a block into the same regression equation and the summary statistics for A 
R-square and its significance noted. Then, three additional regressions were 
run in which each interaction was entered by itself because of severe 
collinearity among the three interaction terms. This multicollinearity made 
interpreting them individually problematic. The regression coefficicents 
for the interaction terms were taken from this last set of regressions.
An alternative methodology for dealing with multicollinearity is 
suggested by Neter, et. al. (1985). They recommend differencing the 
collinear variables with respect to their means. While they state that this 
should reduce multicollinearity substantially, and recommend the use of this 
technique for situations involving polynomial and interaction terms, doing 
so had no appreciable effect on reducing the multicollinearity. Hence, 
results using difference scores are not reported.
Model 2 consisted of the same stock assessments of Urgency and 
Understanding used in Model 1, but the global stock assessment of Capability 
was replaced by four component measures of capability: Organizational, 
Technological, Human, and Financial. These six variables were entered 
together.
Weinzimmer, Mone, and Alwan (1994) noted the infrequent use of 
regression diagnostics in management research. They recommend that
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residual analysis be done to assess the validity of important regression 
assumptions. This analysis was run for each regression in this research. 
With the exception of the residuals of the regressions using average 
magnitude, locus, and activeness discussed above, no regression's residuals 
exhibited significant signs of heteroscedasticity or non normality. Thus 
there was no reason to make any remedial adjustments and the regression 
results are reported as they resulted from the initial regression runs.
Response magnitude. Hypothesis 1 posited that Understanding and 
Capability would have a positive effect on Magnitude. Capability was 
measured two ways, globally and by assessing its components, and Magnitude 
was operationalized in three ways, the number of responses (MAGNUMBR), 
the summed magnitude rating of all the responses a company implemented 
(MAGRATIN), and the ratio of large responses to small responses (LAR/SMA). 
Therefore, six different regressions were run to test Hypothesis 1. Tables 8  
through 10 contain the regression statistics for these equations. Although 
no relationships were suggested between Magnitude and Urgency, or any of 
the interaction terms or squared terms, these were also included in the 
analysis on an exploratory basis.
In Model 1, Capability was significantly positively related to 
MAGNUMBR, MAGRATIN, and LAR/SMA at the .05 level of significance, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1. This means that as the assessment of Capability 
increased, the number of responses rose, the overall magnitude of the 
response set rose, and the responses that were implemented were more likely 
to be large in magnitude.
Understanding, on the other hand, was significantly negatively 
related to all three Magnitude ratings, the opposite of what was hypothesized. 
Two of these relationships, with MAGNUMBR and MAGRATIN, were
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Table 8 - Regressions for MAGNUMBR
Independent Model 1 Model 2
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Urgency .389***
(.102)
Understanding -.326f
(.171)
Capability .220*
(.107)
Urg*Urg
Und*Und
Cap*Cap
Urg(RS)*Und
Urg(RS)*Cap
Und*Cap
Organization
Technological
Human
Finance
n 87
A R-square .219
F-score 7.844
Significance .000
.413***
(.105)
-.253
(.163)
.013
(.017)
.056*
(.027)
-.008
(.014)
-.023
(.0 2 0 )
-.026
(.016)
- . 0 2 2
(.023)
-.465f
(.259)
.510*
(.234)
.512
(.395)
-.171
(.141)
87 87 82
.044 .031 .267
1.629 1.135 4.610
.189 .340 .0 0 1
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 9 - Regressions for MAGRATIN
IndeDendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model 2
Urgency .880***
(.223)
.937*
(.238)
Understanding -.748t
(.391)
-.583
(.369)
Capability .503*
(.243)
Urg*Urg .0 2 2
(.038)
Und*Und .129*
(.061)
Cap*Cap -.016
(.033)
Urg(RS)*Und -.056
(.045)
Urg(RS)*Cap -.059
(.037)
Und*Cap -.050
(.053)
Organization -1.094t
(.587)
Technological 1.168*
(.532)
Human 1.246
(.898)
Finance -.418
(.321)
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
87
.217
7.773
. 0 0 0
87
.043
1.567
.204
87
.032
1.172
.326
82
.271
4.707
. 0 0 0
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 10 - Regressions for LAR/SMA
IndeDendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model 2
Urgency .0 0 2 *
(.0 0 1 )
.003**
(.0 0 1 )
Understanding -.003*
(.0 0 2 )
- . 0 0 2
(.0 0 2 )
Capability .003*
(.0 0 1 )
Urg*Urg . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Cap*Cap . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und -.0 0 0 *
(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Cap -.0 0 0 *
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Cap - . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Organization -004t
(.0 0 2 )
Technological .006**
(.0 0 2 )
Human .003
(.004)
Finance - . 0 0 2
(.0 0 1 )
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
87
.169
5.700
.0 0 1
87
.027
.917
.437
87
.065
2.301
.084
82
.214
3.451
.005
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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significant at the .10 level, but the negative relationship with LAR/SMA was 
significant at a = .05. This means that as Understanding increased, the 
number of responses fell, the overall size of the response set dropped, and 
companies were less likely to choose large responses as opposed to small ones. 
The consistency of these results across three different measures of 
Magnitude indicates this finding is robust. Thus, there is only mixed support 
for Hypothesis 1.
Model 2 also offers very weak support for Hypothesis 1. Only one of 
the component measures of Capability, Technological, was positively related 
to Magnitude, although this was with all three Magnitude measures with at 
least a .05 level of significance. As restaurant managers believed that their 
knowledge and use of technology were more of a strength, their restaurant 
was more likely to have more responses, a larger response set, and 
implement more large responses in relation to small ones.
Organization Capability, however, was negatively related to Magnitude 
in all three equations at the a = .10 level. This indicates that as restaurant 
managers believed their systems, procedures, and administration were a 
strength, the number of responses fell, the size of the response set was 
smaller, and the ratio of large responses to small responses also decreased.
The component measures of Human and Finance were not 
significantly related to Magnitude in any of the regressions. Understanding 
was negatively correlated with Magnitude in Model 2, but in no case 
reaching statistical significance.
Other findings of interest were the positive, significant relationship 
that Urgency had with all three Magnitude measures. Of the six positive, 
significant correlations with measures of Magnitude (out of six possible), 
four were significant at a = .001 (with MAGNUMBR and MAGRATIN) and the
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other two had significance levels of .05 or better. The positive correlations 
mean that when Urgency was higher, restaurants implemented more 
responses, a larger response set, and more large responses in relation to 
smaller ones. Urgency by far had the strongest relationships with 
Magnitude of the three stock assessments, although this result was not 
anticipated nor hypothesized. These results will be discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter 5.
The squared Understanding term was significantly positive in two of 
the three regressions (see Tables 7 and 8 ), indicating a curvilinear 
relationship with Magnitude. Given the regression coefficients of 
Understanding (negative) and Understanding squared (positive), the shape 
of the relationship between Understanding and Magnitude is concave 
upward, indicating a more complex relationship than that suggested by the 
linear effect alone. By conducting a first-derivative test (Chiang, 1984), it is 
possible to determine the point at which the quadratic term will overtake the 
linear one and the relationship between Understanding and Magnitude 
becomes positive (if at all within a feasible range).
The regression equation for MAGNUMBR and the two Understanding 
terms (just including those two variables) is:
MAGNUMBR = -2.198 Und + .056 Und2. ( 1 )
(The regression coefficient for Und was taken from the equation in Step 2, 
and is not shown in Table 7.)
To locate the minimum, the equation is differentiated with respect to 
Understanding and set equal to 0. This yields:
dMAGNUMBR/dUnd = -2.198 + .112 Und = 0. (2)
Solving for Understanding yields the minimum of 
Understanding = 2.198/. 112 = 19.625. (3)
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Thus, the relationship between Understanding and the number of 
responses implemented is negative below 19.625 and positive above it. The 
mean of Understanding is 16.26 and the standard deviation is 3.58. By 
locating on a Normal Table the area associated with a z-score of .94 (19.625 is 
.94 standard deviations away from the mean), it can readily be determined 
that only about 17% of the companies claimed to have had levels o f 
understanding high enough to fall within the range where the relationship 
with Magnitude was positive, as hypothesized.
Using the identical procedure for MAGRATIN, which Und*Und also had 
a significant relationship with:
MAGRATIN = -5.048 Und+ .129 Und2. (4)
Differentiating and setting the result equal to zero:
dMAGRATIN/dUnd = -5.048 + .258 Und = 0. (5)
The minimum point at which the relationship with MAGRATIN turns 
positive is: Und = 5.048/.258 = 19.565, an almost identical amount to that above. 
The interpretation is the same, indicating that the relationship between 
Understanding and Magnitude, while negative over most of the feasible 
range of Understanding values, at very high levels of Understanding 
(around the top 17%) turns positive.
Finally, although not hypothesized, two interaction terms 
Urg(RS)*Und and Urg(RS)*Cap were negatively, significantly correlated 
with LAR/SMA, the ratio of large responses to small. The A R-square statistic 
for Step 3 was significant at a = .10 (see Table 10). Given that Urg(RS) is 
reverse scored, the interactions of both Capability and Understanding with 
Urgency are positive. This indicates the effect of Capability on Magnitude 
(measured by LAR/SMA) is stronger at higher levels of Urgency, and that 
the effect of Understanding on Magnitude (measured by LAR/SMA) is
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stronger at higher levels of Urgency. In response to Urgent interpretations, 
both Capability and Understanding had a greater impact on the ratio of large 
to small responses implemented. The reverse is also true. At higher levels of 
both Understanding and Capability, the effect of Urgency on Magnitude 
(measured by LAR/SMA) is also strengthened.
Response im m ediacy. Hypothesis 2 posited that U rg en cy, 
Understanding, and Capability would have positive effects on Immediacy. 
While Immediacy was operationalized in two ways, for the sake of brevity 
only the results for IMMYEAR are reported here, since the results were 
almost identical between the two operationalizations. Recall that lower 
values of IMMYEAR indicate earlier responses. Again, the interaction and 
squared terms were added into the equation, although no hypotheses were 
posited concerning them. The regression statistics are reported in Table 11.
The results can be briefly summarized by stating that no relationship 
was statistically significant. Urgency, Understanding, or Capability 
(regardless of how it was measured), did not in their linear, quadratic, or 
interaction forms significantly affect IMMYEAR. The stock assessments have 
no discernible effect on when a restaurant organization began to respond to 
the strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness. An investigation of the 
significance of the F-scores also reveals that no part of Model 1 was 
significant, and it was also insignificant as a whole. The results were 
essentially identical for IMMONTH and so are not reported here.
The reasons for this lack of significance may not involve a 
straightforward and categorical rejection of the logic behind the hypotheses 
but could involve methodology and the manner in which the focal strategic 
issue unfolded slowly over time. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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Table 11 - Regressions for IMMYEAR
IndeDendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model
Urgency -.068
(.059)
-.081
(.062)
Understanding -.094
(.1 0 0 )
-.089
(.096)
Capability .005
(.062)
Urg*Urg -.008
(.1 0 0 )
Und*Und .0 0 1
(.016)
Cap*Cap -.013
(.008)
Urg(RS)*Und .006
(.0 1 2 )
Urg(RS)*Cap . 0 0 0
(.009)
Und*Cap . 0 0 0
(.014)
Organization .137
(.153)
Technological .060
(.138)
Human -.336
(.233)
Finance .025
(.083)
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
82
.032
.877
.457
82
.047
1.281
.287
82
.003
.067
.977
77
.068
.8 6 6
.524
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Response locus. Hypothesis 3 posited that both Understanding and 
Capability would have a positive relationship with Locus (or externality of 
response). Locus was measured in two ways: EXT/INT, or the number of 
external responses divided by the number of internal responses, and 
EXTNUMBR, the number of external responses. The results of the regression 
equation to test these relationships are presented in Tables 12 and 13. As 
before, Urgency, the squared terms and the interactions are also included 
and analyzed.
Capability was significantly correlated with only one Locus measure, 
EXT/INT, at the .10 level of significance. This indicates that as the Capability 
assessment was more favorable, restaurants tended to implement more 
external responses in relation to the number of internal responses. 
Capability seemed to have no significant impact on the actual number of 
external responses implemented.
The Technology Capability component was positively related to both 
EXT/INT and EXTNUMBR, again at only the ,10 level of significance, indicating 
that as restaurant managers' confidence in their knowledge and usage of 
technology increased, the proportion of external responses to internal 
responses increased, and the number of external responses increased. No 
other Capability components were significantly related to either Locus 
measure, although both Organizational and Finance capability had negative 
regression coefficients in both cases, contrary to predictions. Overall, these 
findings represent weak support for Hypothesis 3.
Understanding was negatively, significantly correlated with EXT/INT 
in both models at a = .10 (see Table 12), meaning that as the Understanding 
assessment increased, the proportion of external to internal responses
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Table 12 - Regressions for EXT/INT
IndeDendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model 2
Urgency .007**
(.0 0 2 )
.007**
(.0 0 2 )
Understanding -.007f
(.004)
-006f
(.003)
Capability .004f
(.0 0 2 )
Urg*Urg . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und .0 0 1 *
(.0 0 0 )
Cap*Cap . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und - . 0 0 1
(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Cap . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Cap - . 0 0 0
(.0 0 1 )
Organization -.008
(.005)
Technological .009t
(.005)
Human . 0 1 0
(.008)
Finance -.003
(.003)
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
87
.166
5.557
.0 0 2
87
.063
2 .2 1 2
.093
87
.032
1.127
.344
82
.2 1 1
3.388
.005
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 13- Regressions for EXTNUMBR
Inderiendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model
Urgency .179***
(.048)
.185’'
(.050)
Understanding -.133
(.081)
- . 1 1 0
(.078)
Capability .079
(.050)
Urg*Urg .003
(.0 1 0 )
Und*Und .030*
(.0 1 2 )
Cap*Cap - . 0 0 1
(.007)
Urg(RS)*Und - . 0 1 2
(.009)
Urg(RS)*Cap -.011
(.008)
Und*Cap -.007
(.0 1 1 )
Organization -.157
(.124)
Technological .189t
(.1 1 2 )
Human .195
(.189)
Finance -.069
(.068)
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
87
.190
6.574
.0 0 1
87
.054
1.912
.134
87
.025
.877
.457
82
.225
3.668
.003
*** - Significant at alpha = .001
** - Significant at alpha = .01
* - Significant at alpha = .05
t  - Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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decreased, and the response set was more internal. This is directly opposite 
of Hypothesis 3's prediction but is consistent with the finding of 
Understanding's relationship with Magnitude. It was also negatively related 
to EXTNUMBR, but not significantly.
Und*Und was positively, significantly correlated with both locus 
variables, again identifying a curvilinear relationship between 
understanding and locus. Since both Und and Und*Und were correlated only 
with EXT/INT only the relationship of Understanding with this locus measure 
will be examined. The regression equation for EXT/INT, including only the 
Understanding terms (not all coefficients shown in Table 11) is:
EXT/INT = -.055 Und + .0014 Und2. (6 ) 
d(E/I)/dUnd = -.055 + .0028 Und = 0. (7)
Critical Point - Und = .055/.0028 = 19.64. (8 )
Given the signs of the terms, the shape of the function is concave up, 
and that it reaches a minimum at Understanding = 19.64. Below this point the 
relationship with EXT/INT is negative, above it is becomes positive. The mean 
of Understanding is 16.27 and its standard deviation is 3.58. Again, only when 
Understanding is very high (around 15-17% as before) does the relationship 
with EXT/INT become positive as hypothesized. Below this point, increases in 
Understanding are associated with a decreased proportion of external 
responses to internal ones. Above it, however, when the Understanding 
assessment is very high, increases in Understanding lead to increases in the 
proportion of external to internal responses.
As for the other variables not hypothesized to have a relationship with 
locus, Urgency again had a strong, positive relationship with both measures. 
Tables 11 and 12 show that the relationship was stronger with EXTNUMBR 
than with EXT/INT. This means that the higher the assessment of Urgency
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the greater the proportion of external to internal responses and the larger 
the number of external responses implemented. In other words, in 
increasingly urgent situations, restaurants responded in a more external 
fashion. None of the interactions between the stock assessments and either 
measure of response locus was significant.
Response activeness. Hypothesis 4 posited positive relationships 
between all three stock assessment and Activeness. It also posited positive 
relationships between the three interaction terms and Activeness. 
Activeness was measured in two ways: ACT/PAS, the ratio of active responses 
to passive responses, and ACTNUMBR, the number of active responses 
implemented. The results of these regression equations are presented in 
Tables 14 and 15.
Urgency was significantly, positively correlated with Activeness in all 
four models, meaning that the higher the assessment of Urgency the greater 
the proportion of active responses to passive responses and the larger the 
number of active responses. Urgent interpretations led to a more active 
response stance, providing strong support for Hypothesis 4.
Capability was also positively, significantly correlated with both 
measures, although with ACTNUMBR at only a = .10, indicating that when 
assessments of Capability were high, restaurants were more likely to have a 
large number of active responses to passive ones and were also likely to have 
a higher number of active responses. This significant result also provided 
support for Hypothesis 4.
The components of Capability again provided mixed support. 
Organizational Capability was negatively correlated with both Activeness 
measures. When restaurant managers thought their systems, procedures,
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Table 14 - Regressions for ACT/PAS
IndeDendent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model:
Urgency o n * * *
(.003)
.0 1 2 *
(.003)
Understanding -.0 1 1 *
(.005)
-.008f
(.004)
Capability .007*
(.003)
Urg*Urg . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und .0 0 2 *
(.0 0 1 )
Cap*Cap - . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und - . 0 0 1
(.0 0 1 )
Urg(RS)*Cap -.ooit
(.0 0 0 )
Und*Cap - . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
Organization -.016*
(.007)
Technological .014*
(.006)
Human .018
(.0 1 1 )
Finance -.005
(.004)
n 87 87 87 82
A R-square .237 .044 .039 .292
F-score 8.693 1.663 1.503 5.224
Significance .000 .182 . 2 2 0 .0 0 0
- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 15 - Regressions for ACTNUMBR
Independent
Variables Step 1
Model 1 
Step 2 Step 3
Model!
Urgency .251***
(.062)
.273*
(.064)
Understanding -.215*
(.105)
-.165+
(.1 0 0 )
Capability .129t
(.065)
Urg*Urg .003
(.0 1 0 )
Und*Und .034*
(.016)
Cap*Cap -.003
(.009)
Urg(RS)*Und -.018
(.0 1 2 )
Urg(RS)*Cap -.016
(.0 1 0 )
Und*Cap -.014
(.014)
Organization -.325*
(.158)
Technological .279f
(.143)
Human .348
(.241)
Finance -.114
(.086)
n
A R-square 
F-score 
Significance
87
.230
8.377
.0 0 0
87
.039
1.430
.240
87
.034
1.253
.297
82
.284
5.014
.0 0 0
- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error 
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3 
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe 
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate 
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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and administration were a strength, they tended to have fewer active 
responses in relation to passive ones and fewer active responses. Thus, 
perceived organizational strength tended to inhibit active responses.
Technological Capability was positively, significantly correlated with 
both measures of Activeness but only marginally with ACTNUMBR. The 
greater the confidence in their knowledge and use of technology, the higher 
the proportion of active to passive responses and the larger the number of 
active responses. Perceived strength in the technology area tended to 
enhance activeness.
The other two component measures were both insignificant. Taken 
together, the component measures of Capability provide mixed support for 
Hypothesis 4.
Understanding was negatively, significantly correlated with both 
measures of Activeness at the .05 level for Model 1 and at the .10 level for 
Model 2. Higher assessments of Understanding led to lower proportions of 
active to passive responses and fewer active responses. Tables 13 and 14 
reveal that the relationship of Understanding with Activeness is curvilinear, 
since Und*Und is significantly, positively correlated with both measures at 
the .05 level. The first derivative test was employed again. The equations are 
provided below.
ACT/PAS = -.065 Und + 0016 Und?. (9) 
d(A/P)/dUnd = -.065 + .0032 Und = 0. (10)
Critical Point: Und = .065/.0032 = 20.31. (11)
The curve is concave, falling at Understanding values lower than 20.31 
and rising thereafter. When assessments of Understanding are low, 
Understanding tends to have a negative impact of ACT/PAS: the higher the 
assessed Understanding the lower the proportion of active to passive
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responses. After the critical point, however, this relationship reverses and 
higher assessments of Understanding lead to a higher proportion of active to 
passive responses. Recall that the mean of Understanding is 16.27 and its 
standard deviation is 3.58. This would indicate (using the Normal table again) 
that the relationship between Understanding and ACT/PAS is negative in all 
but the top 9% of the range of Understanding, where it is positive.
The identical calculations for ACTNUMBR follow.
ACTNUMBR = -1.348 Und + 0339 Und2. (12) 
d(A/P)/dUnd = -1.348 + .0678 Und = 0. (13)
Critical Point: Und = 1.348/.0678 = 19.88. (14)
The minimum point is about the same here as previously and the 
interpretation is the same. The negative relationship between 
Understanding and Activeness becomes positive in the top 15% range of 
Understanding scores. This finding is not supportive of Hypothesis 4.
Of the six relationships between the three interaction terms and the 
two Activeness measures, only one, Urg(RS)*Cap with ACT/PAS was 
significant, and that at only the , 1 0  significance level and in the opposite 
direction of that hypothesized. All six correlations were negative, indicating, 
given the reverse-scored nature of Urgency, that the interaction between 
Urgency and Capability is positive. The interpretation is identical to the 
previous interactions: at higher levels of one variable, the effect of the 
second variable on Activeness (measured as ACT/PAS) is stronger. At higher 
levels of Urgency, Capability more strongly affects Activeness and vice 
versa. The interaction terms provide no support for Hypothesis 4.
Summary of Significant Findings.
Table 16 contains a summary of the results of the hypotheses. The 
results are reviewed below.
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Hypothesis la  found mixed support. Capability (global) was positively 
related to response set Magnitude (measured three ways) at the .05 
significance level. Technological Capability was also positively related to 
Magnitude at the .05 level in all three cases. Financial and Human Capability, 
however, were not related to Magnitude at all, and Organizational Capability 
was negatively related to Magnitude at the .10 level of significance in all 
three cases, opposite of expectations. The higher the perception of 
Organization Capability the lower the magnitude of response.
Hypothesis lb was rejected. Not only was Understanding not positively 
related to response set Magnitude, it was negatively related to it at the .05 
level of significance in all three Model 1 regressions. (It was negatively, but 
not significantly, correlated with the Magnitude measures in Model 2.) This 
finding is directly contrary to what was hypothesized and indicates that the 
more executives believed they understood the nutrition awareness issue, the 
less they responded to it. The relationship with Magnitude exhibited  
curvilinearity, however: it turned positive in the top 15% range o f  
Understanding scores. Understanding squared was positively related to two 
of the Magnitude measures. Within this range, the hypothesized positive 
relationship obtained.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c were all rejected. Immediacy was not 
affected by Urgency, Understanding, or Capability (regardless of how it was 
operationalized). This lack of significance was a surprising result, given the 
strong theoretical and intuitive appeal of these proposed effects. The issue of 
timing and how this particular issue evolved may have had an impact on 
these results.
Hypothesis 3a was rejected: Understanding did not positively affect 
response Locus regardless of how it was measured. In fact, it was negatively,
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significantly correlated with one of the Locus measures. This result 
exhibited curvilinearity again, however, turning positive in the upper 15% 
range of Understanding scores.
Table 16 - Summary of Results
Hypothesis la: Cap -> Mag
Hypothesis lb: Und -> Mag
Hypothesis 2a: Urg -> Imm
Hypothesis 2b: Und -> Imm
Hypothesis 2c: Cap -> Imm
Hypothesis 3a: Und -> Loc
Hypothesis 3b: Cap -> Loc
Hypothesis 4a: Urg -> Act
Hypothesis 4b: Und -> Act
Hypothesis 4c: Cap -> Act
Hypothesis 4d: Und*Cap -> Act
Hypothesis 4e: Und*Urg -> Act
Hypothesis 4f: Cap*Urg -> Act
Mixed - global had a positive effect, 
components both positive and 
negative
Rejected - negative, significant 
effect; positive curvilinear effect
Rejected - no significant 
relationships
Rejected - no significant 
relationships
Rejected - no significant 
relationships
Rejected - negative, significant 
effect; positive curvilinear effect
Moderate - global had a positive, 
significant effect, as did one 
component measure
Strong support - positive, significant 
at the .001 level
Rejected - negative, significant 
effect; positive curvilinear effect
Mixed - global had a positive effect, 
components both positive and 
negative
Rejected - no significant 
relationships
Rejected - no significant 
relationships
Rejected - relationship opposite that 
hypothesized
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Hypothesis 3b obtained moderate support. Capability (global) was 
positively correlated with only one Locus measure, although marginally. 
Technological Capability was significantly related to both measures of Locus 
at the .10 level of significance. None of the other component measures had a 
significant regression coefficient. Generally, the greater the assessment of 
Capability, the more external the response set.
Hypothesis 4a was supported at the .001 level of significance. Urgency 
had a strong, positive effect on both measures of response activeness: the 
higher the urgency of the issue the more active the response set. Urgency 
also was significantly, positively related to Magnitude and Locus, also, 
although this was not hypothesized. The impact of Urgency on the response 
variables (except for Immediacy) was the most consistent and strongest 
finding in this study. The higher the assessment of Urgency, the larger the 
magnitude of the response set, the more externally focused the response set, 
and the more active the response set.
Hypothesis 4b was not supported. Not only was Understanding not 
positively related to either measure of Activeness, it was significantly, 
negatively related to both. Again, however, the relationship was a 
curvilinear one as Understanding squared was related to both measures 
positively and significantly. Over most of the range of Understanding, the 
relationship with Activeness was negative, but in around the top 15% of the 
range of Understanding scores the relationship turned positive. The 
curvilinearity of the relationship of Understanding with the response 
variables was an interesting and robust finding.
Hypothesis 4c obtained mixed support. While Capability (global) was 
positively related to both measures of Activeness, as was Technological 
Capability, Organization Capability was negatively related to them.
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Confidence in the technology prowess of the organization led to a more 
active response set while confidence in administrative skill had the opposite 
effect. While the relationship between Technological Capability with 
Activeness was framed in causal terms, it may be spurious since 
organizations that are more likely to respond actively are also more likely to 
be more technologically competent due to a more proactive and pioneering 
attitude toward new trends and innovation. The Organization Capability 
result may address organizational inertia issues. It is interesting to recall 
that these two capability measures were positively correlated.
Hypotheses 4d, 4e and 4f were not supported. None of the interactions 
was positively related to either measure of Activeness, and one was 
significantly, negatively correlated, albeit at a = .10. This would seem to 
indicate that the threat rigidity hypothesis suggested by Staw, et. al. (1981) is 
not supported in this case. Strictly speaking, however, threat rigidity 
suggests a curvilinear relationship with Response Activeness, which would 
require testing the squared terms of the interactions. This test was done, 
although not reported. None of the regression coefficients of these terms 
approached statistical significance.
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Chapter 6 - Discussion and Implications
This dissertation addressed strategic issue management and the 
relationship between strategic issue interpretation and response. The 
literature on these topics was reviewed and a model constructed. The link 
between interpretation and response was explored in greater depth and four 
hypotheses posited which delineated this link in greater detail. To some 
extent, three of the four hypotheses found support, but aspects of each could 
be rejected outright.
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by examining how 
organizations in a single-industry responded to an actual strategic issue 
based on their interpretations of it. The idea that interpretation influences 
response has not gone without empirical support or previous investigation, 
however. For example, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) examined this 
relationship, but only in a single organization. Dutton and Webster (1988) 
also investigated this relationship, but used an artificial in-basket simulation 
methodology. Schneider & de Meyer (1991) investigated the effect of culture 
on this relationship, but used a case study and executive informants in a non 
organizational setting. Thomas, et. al. (1993) also used case-studies in their 
data collection in the hospital industry that, while realistic, were still 
artificial. They also used a different framework, opportunity-threat, than 
the one used here; a framework that, while very popular, under emphasizes 
considerations of feasibility (understanding and capability) in the 
interpretation process. This dissertation thus makes a unique contribution to 
the area of strategic issue management and interpretation. Its contribution 
is mainly descriptive rather than normative, just as much of the research on 
SIM has been, given that performance outcomes were not measured.
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The meaning and relevance of these findings will be discussed, along 
with other significant findings that emerged which were not hypothesized.
Methodological Issues and Caveats
Before continuing with this discussion, several caveats should be 
addressed and some interpretational (related to the findings of this study) 
and methodological issues explored. These issues are often not discussed until 
after a summary review and discussion of the relevance of the findings. Due 
to the retrospective nature of this research, however, and the tendency of 
such methodology to be prone to various biases, a frank appraisal of these 
potential problems before discussion of findings may answer some questions 
before they arise.
One obvious (and intentional) omission of the research was the area of 
context. Recall that in Figure 1, interpretation influences response while 
both issue characteristics and interpretation context influence 
interpretation. Variance due to issue characteristics was held constant by 
examining a single issue, the trend of increased consumer nutrition 
awareness, and its effect on the restaurant industry. Contextual variables, 
however, such as size, strategy, and structure, were not held constant and 
might affect the way the issue was interpreted, and hence the response.
While these considerations represent areas of fruitful future research, 
they are of no immediate concern in this case due to the particular focus of 
this study. The main idea tested was that interpretation influences response 
in certain predictable, common ways among different organizations. It is 
very likely, for example, that large restaurant organizations, due to their 
greater visibility, would have interpreted this issue differently than would 
small restaurant organizations. While this is an important idea, this research
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did not attempt to explore the causes of managerial interpretations, but 
rather took them as given and examined the effect they would have on 
organizational actions. The lack of contextual variables or controls in no 
way calls into question the basic findings of this research, that 
interpretations, regardless of how they were reached or what may have 
influenced their creation, influence response.
An additional concern is the study methodology itself. The use of 
retrospective accounts in management research has been questioned by 
some as being problematic (Huber & Power, 1985; Golden, 1992), this being 
especially true regarding perceptual data. The concern is that managers 
may not be able to accurately recall events from the not-so-recent past, and 
the data they provide would be very noisy. This concern, on its own, would 
not represent a significant problem here i f  the noise were random. In that 
case, it would be assumed that the significance of whatever results emerged 
may be attenuated by the noise, but not invalidated. For example, given that 
significant findings obtained in this study, one might think that, if the data 
were noisy, the results may have been stronger. These weak results would 
not call into the question the validity of the findings that did manage to 
emerge amidst the noise. It may even indicate that the relationships must 
have been strong to have emerged as they did with so little statistical power 
at hand, though that could only be conjecture.
The primary issue here is not merely that managers may have trouble 
recalling past events accurately, but that, when they attempt to do so, various 
biases are likely to creep into the process (Schwenk, 1985). In this research, 
for example, one might propose that, instead of interpretation affecting 
response, the responses implemented and their effects would bias the 
recollection of interpretations regarding related past events. Perhaps a
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manager in a restaurant that implemented few responses to this issue and 
which later suffered no ill effect, would attribute a high level of rationality 
to their past activities and would, therefore, claim that their level of 
understanding was high: "We knew people really didn't care."
The possibility of bias is a serious concern because it might call into 
question the validity of this study in a way that mere noisy recollections may 
not. Given the nature of the methodology, it is not possible to categorically 
dismiss this as a possibility. Alternative hypotheses concerning bias in 
management recall are possible, and so the steps taken to minimize such bias 
are reviewed again.
In doing so, it is important to note that none of the authors addressing 
this issue concluded that research using retrospective accounts should be 
abandoned. Indeed, there are circumstances and topics that can only be 
investigated by using retrospective accounts (Huber & Power, 1985; Golden, 
1992). The key is to use retrospective accounts with an awareness of their 
limitations and to address them in data collection methodology.
Multi-item scales were employed to measure the interpretation 
variables. These are inherently more reliable than single item scales 
(Kerlinger, 1986), such as the single-item strategy scale used in Golden 
(1992). More reliable scales are less prone to bias.
Also, before the interpretation items were included on the study 
questionnaire, factual questions about the respondent's job position and 
duties were asked. This would "prime" the respondents' recollections by 
starting with events and situations they could readily access, following 
Boeker (1989).
In addition to the priming questions, a copy of one of Phil Sokolof's 
advertisements was included with each questionnaire to increase the
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salience of the issue for the respondent. Inclusion of this advertisement 
would reduce confusion about the events and issues the questionnaire was 
about.
The way the questionnaire was constructed also took potential bias into 
account. The interpretation questions were included after the factual 
oriented questions were asked and mention was made of the enclosed 
advertisement, reversing one common practice of collecting information on 
the dependent variable before the independent (Sheatsley, 1983), and for 
good reason. Asking respondents initially what responses their organization 
took would have heightened the chance that the interpretation data would 
have been biased because respondents would have just finished thinking 
about what their companies did before being asked about what motivated 
them to do it. It was thought that the risk of the subjective data (the 
interpretations) biasing the objective data (either a restaurant implemented 
a response or it did not) was much less than the risk of the objective biasing 
the subjective.
Beyond consideration concerning question order, it is important to 
note that respondents did not provide the final dependent variable data. 
These data were the result, in all but 3 cases (MAGNUMBR, IMMYEAR and 
IMMONTH), of combining ratings from the expert panel (none of whom were 
respondents) with the lists of responses provided by respondents. Basing the 
dependent variables, in part, on expert ratings does not eliminate bias, but 
may attenuate it compared to what it would have been had respondents been 
asked to "Please rate how Active you considered your set of responses to this 
issue to have been on a scale from 1 to 5."
It would be unwise to argue that these steps render alternative 
hypotheses completely impossible, but they do reduce their likelihood of
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validity, leading to confidence that the results are what they appear to be: 
evidence of interpretation influencing response.
Interpretation and Response
A major finding of this study was that the link between interpretation 
and response was strongly supported. The interpretations that executive- 
level managers made of the consumer nutrition awareness issue influenced 
the manner in which their restaurants responded to it, supporting a strong 
body of conceptual and theoretical literature that has been traditionally 
somewhat weak on the empirical side. This study, rather than using a 
simulation or doing an in-depth case study of a single organization, used data 
from real executives from many organizations facing a real strategic issue. 
That such a study could be conducted successfully, even though it addressed 
events that were several years in the past, bodes well for continued research 
in the area of strategic issue interpretation and response.
The primary focus of this dissertation, however, was not to test 
whether interpretation affected response. On the contrary, as can be readily 
ascertained from the literature review and hypotheses sections, that 
interpretation affected response was taken as a given. Rather, the question 
of interest was, which interpretations led to which responses? Here this 
dissertation has made its contribution.
Choice of frameworks. Interpretation could have been operationalized 
in one of two ways: the urgency-feasibility approach of Dutton and Duncan 
(1987), or the better known and more often used opportunity-threat 
framework (Ansoff, 1965; Dutton & Jackson, 1987), or even both. The first 
approach was used due to its conceptual clarity and completeness as well as 
its relevance to the research issue at hand. An organization considering 
whether to respond to an issue must assess the amount of time, information,
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and resources it has with which to do so. The urgency-feasibility framework 
addresses the stock assessments directly, while the opportunity-threat 
framework does not. This omission in the opportunity-threat framework is a 
significant one, given that, while it contains consideration of the need to 
respond, it does not as clearly include consideration of the ab ility  to respond. 
The urgency-feasibility framework contains both considerations, given that 
urgency addresses the need question. Dutton and Duncan (1987) correctly 
identified both considerations as important ones in determining how an 
organization would respond, as has been shown in this dissertation.
The second framework is not altogether inadequate: on the contrary, it 
directly and completely addresses the important consideration of likelihood 
of impact and effect on performance (Ansoff, 1980). As such, this research 
was not an exhaustive study of the different possible interpretations and 
their affect on response. Including the extra items to measure these 
additional constructs, however, would have lengthened what some 
respondents considered to be an already long questionnaire (based on 
telephone conversations with several executives and managers). Even so, 
the issue of opportunity and threat interpretation could be addressed 
indirectly by the urgency-feasibility framework, given that an issue viewed 
as urgent and infeasible may be more likely viewed as a threat and vice 
versa. Never the less, care should be exercised in drawing such implications 
since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between elements in the two 
frameworks.
Relevance and importance of findings. Interpretation was shown here 
to affect response in a variety of ways. A quick synopsis of the major 
findings is presented first, followed by a more in-depth discussion of each.
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Urgency had the strongest relationship with the response variables. 
It had consistently positive and significant relationships with all but 
Immediacy. Understanding, contrary to expectations, was negatively and 
significantly related to all the response variables except Immediacy. The 
relationships tended to be curvilinear (concave up), which was also 
unexpected. Capability was measured two ways, globally and by its 
components. Global Capability was positively and significantly related to at 
least one operationalization of each response variable, except Immediacy. 
These positive relationships were hypothesized. The technological 
component of Capability was significantly and positively related to all 
response variables, except Immediacy. The organizational component was 
significantly and negatively related to both Magnitude and Locus, contrary 
to expectations. Thus, different components of Capability had very different 
affects on response. No interpretation variable had a significant 
relationship with Immediacy.
These findings extend the current level of knowledge in the following 
ways. By investigating an actual strategic issue rather than using a 
previously employed artificial research methodology, these findings lead to 
greater confidence in the reality of the relationship between interpretation 
and response. The findings related to Urgency's effect demonstrate the 
empirical validity of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) arguments concerning that 
construct's effect on strategic momentum. Such effects had not previously 
been demonstrated using actual "field" data. Capability's effect on response, 
found to be significant here, had also not been demonstrated using such data.
The concave-up relationship that Understanding had with the 
response variables was unanticipated and opposite of what was hypothesized. 
This unexpected finding indicates that not all strategic issues will be
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responded to based on identical relationships between interpretation and 
response. Issue characteristics may not only have a direct effect on 
intepretations but may also moderate the effect of interpretation on 
response, as well. This issue-moderation effect has not previously been 
addressed.
Another important extension of current knowledge involves the 
differential effects of global capability and Capability's components. While 
global Capability's effect on the response dimensions was generally positive, 
this effect was duplicated by only one of the four component measures, 
Technological Capability. Beyond this, Organizational Capability had 
generally negative effects, the oppositive of what was predicted. Dutton and 
Duncan (1987) presented Capability as a monolithic construct, but these 
results indicate that doing so may not tell the whole story. While some 
components of Capability may have a positive impact on an organization's 
issue responsiveness, others may have the opposite effect of inhibiting such 
responsiveness, thus representing core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
These findings represent important advancements in our 
understanding of the interpretation of, and response to, strategic issues. 
These findings, and others, are now discussed in greater depth.
The most consistent finding in this research was the effect of urgency 
on response. When managers saw the nutrition issue as urgent their 
companies implemented response sets that were larger in magnitude, more 
external in focus, and higher in activeness. The only re la tionsh ip  
hypothesized was that concerning activeness. One element of Dutton and 
Duncan's (1987) formulation of the construct of urgency was visibility. An 
issue visible to the public requires a direct, active response. Under the light 
of publicity, it was often not possible for restaurants to duck the nutrition
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issue by passive responses that failed to really do something about it. Of 
course, larger companies, particularly the ones named in the advertisements, 
would have been more visible in relation to this issue and probably would 
have had interpretations of higher urgency. This contextual variable (size) 
should be included in future research as it has already been found to 
influence issue responsiveness due to greater visibility (Goodstein, 1994).
Similar logic can be used to explain the other urgency results. One 
item on the Urgency scale addresses whether an issue will be around for a 
long time. If managers believe it will be long-lasting, then they are more 
likely to be willing to commit more time, energy, and resources to 
responding to it. Such commitments would lead to larger response sets. Yet 
another aspect of urgency as discussed by Dutton and Duncan (1987) is 
importance. Important issues are seen as urgent, and this importance would 
allow managers to justify the expenditures necessary to implement larger 
response sets.
As for Urgency's effect on Locus, visibility may again be an important 
factor. Internal responses are not likely to be visible to the public, and even 
though the company may have responded to an issue, important 
constituencies may not be aware of the response. A visible, important issue 
would have a high level of salience for external stakeholders, and one way 
that companies can signal these important groups is to implement external, 
not internal, responses.
These last two relationships were not hypothesized, and it is important 
not to capitalize on what may be a chance result in theory building and 
testing (Neter, et. al., 1985). Never the less, the strength and consistency of 
these findings are compelling. Urgency emerges as the most powerful 
interpretational influence on organizational response. Given its prominent
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position, it would seem to have practical relevance to managers trying to 
package and sell issues to top management (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). 
Urgency emerged in this study as the most powerful driver of response 
magnitude, locus, and activeness. If these response outcomes are desired, 
managers can stress the issue's likely longevity, visibility, and time pressure, 
not to mention the issue's importance and the need to respond. While some of 
these implications seem obvious (importance), some may not be as well 
known or salient (issue longevity). This finding is not only relevant to 
managers, but to anyone desiring to influence organizational activities 
(lobbyist groups, for example).
Urgency emerges from this research as more than simply a 
consideration of the amount of time available to implement responses. In 
future research, it may be important to examine the different aspects of 
urgency (visibility, importance, longevity, etc.) to see which components of 
urgency are most relevant. Research along these lines would heighten the 
relevance of such research to practitioners. As it stands, the direct 
implication is that to drive organizational action managers should make an 
issue seem more urgent. Such advice is nothing new and is probably at too 
high a level of aggregation to be of much use. For example, is stressing issue 
longevity a more effective motivator to action than visibility? Perhaps the 
relative importance of these components of urgency also depends upon issue 
characteristics and interpretational context. If so, how? What are the 
relationships?
The second component of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) drivers of 
strategic momentum is issue feasibility, hypothesized as having a positive 
impact on strategic change. The two components of feasibility tested here 
are understanding and capability. Both of these variables were hypothesized
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to have positive correlations with magnitude, locus, and activeness (also 
immediacy, to be discussed later). The results here were not as unequivocal 
as those concerning Urgency.
For example, the stock assessment of Understanding was not linearly, 
positively correlated with any of the three response variables listed above. 
The linear component was consistently negative with all three, although not 
always significantly. The relationship was also not linear once the squared 
term was entered. This squared term had a positive coefficient (statistically 
significant in six out of seven regressions) leading to a conclusion that, at 
lower levels of understanding, the relationship between understanding and 
the response dimensions was negative, but that it turned positive at high 
levels of understanding (generally in the top 15% range). What could 
explain this odd result?
It may be that understanding has a threshold kind of impact on 
response. Understanding is seen as an assessment of the stock of information 
and is, thus, inversely related to uncertainty. At low levels of understanding, 
managers might be well aware that they do not have enough information to 
be able to respond effectively to an issue, creating an aura of caution that 
additional information may only serve to heighten. Managers in companies 
with a slightly larger stock of information may not be motivated by this 
increased understanding to implement larger, more external, and more 
active response sets. On the contrary, if a wait-and-see attitude prevails 
when understanding is low, managers may use the additional information as 
a justification for greater caution, due to the generally negative framing of 
uncertainty. "We don't know what we should do, and here is all the data that 
shows we don't."
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At some level, however, once a threshold level of understanding is 
reached, managers in companies with higher levels of understanding are no 
longer disturbed by a lack of information but are very confident they have 
enough knowledge to act. This confidence then leads to larger, more 
external, more active response sets in companies with additional information 
due to the more positive frame these managers put on new information. This 
somewhat tortuous logic would explain the pattern obtained. If this 
explanation is true, however, why was the threshold as high as the 85th 
percentile? Was it as high as it seemed?
The Understanding scale had six items, and the highest score possible 
was a 30. The mean was 16.27, with a standard deviation of 3.58. The 
minimum of the differential function was generally near 20, at which point 
the relationship turned positive. These results indicate that the mean item 
response would be around 3.3. On two of the items, therefore, the typical 
respondent would have answered at least 4, indicating a recollection of good 
understanding (the items were scored so that higher values meant more 
understanding). Such scores do not represent a high assessment of 
understanding and may indicate a lack of bias since biased data would 
probably include claims to higher levels of understanding than actually 
existed (Feldman & March, 1981; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). Thus, the level of 
understanding at which the relationship turned positive was not as high as it 
might seem because, at that level, respondents still did not claim a very high 
level of understanding.
An alternative explanation may lie in the dynamics of this particular 
issue. By 1990, the nutrition awareness trend had been building for some 
time, and many restaurants had already responded to it. For example, D'Lites 
restaurant operated in the mid-1980s and claimed to have healthier fast food.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
123
By 1990, however, D'Lites had already closed down, and other restaurants also 
had some experience with serving healthy food. Thus, when the 1990 ad blitz 
occurred, some in the restaurant industry had already formed an opinion 
that the healthy eating trend did not really affect them. This conclusion was 
supported by some comments made on returned questionnaires such as, 
"Healthy eating is a myth," "People talk lean but eat fat," and "We used heart- 
healthy symbols. They were the kiss of death." If this were the case, then 
the more restaurant executives believed they understood the issue, the less 
compelled they felt to do anything substantial about it, thus explaining the 
result in the negative range of Understanding.
Unfortunately, the early experiences of some restaurants with the 
nutrition awareness issue does not explain why the relationship would turn 
positive at higher levels. It may be that those companies that were very 
confident of their understanding were taking the ads at face value as 
indicating a real desire for healthy food in restaurants, a conclusion not 
supported by subsequent events (Gibson, 1993). This suggests the odd 
situation of those who do not think they understand responding the most; 
those who think they understand more than the first group responding less; 
and those who think they understand more than the second but not as much 
as the first responding more. Obviously this awkward explanation has some 
holes in it.
One possibility is that the type of restaurant, fast food versus sit-down, 
for example, would act as a moderator by influencing how well restaurant 
executives thought they understood the issue or how a certain level of 
understanding would influence response. Data on these variables were not 
collected, and thus exploring the impact of restaurant type on understanding
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levels and responses clearly represents a fruitful avenue for future 
research.
These results on Understanding do not support the ideas of Dutton & 
Duncan (1987) that higher levels of understanding create greater strategic 
momentum. It may be that additional variables need to be included to more 
fully describe the relationship.
One important caveat to note is that the reliability on the 
Understanding scale was somewhat low at alpha = .67. This is slightly below 
the standard hurdle rate of alpha = .70 set by Nunnally (1978). It may be that 
the results, though significant, were influenced by the relatively low 
reliability of the Understanding scale. These results should be considered 
tentative, therefore, and more definitive conclusions must await additional 
investigation using a more reliable measure.
As for the Capability portion of the feasibility assessment, results 
showed mixed, though overall favorable, support for its hypothesized 
relationships. Capability was measured in two ways: globally and by its 
possible components. The results using the global measure are discussed 
first, followed by the results using the component measures, and then the 
relationships between these two sets of measures.
Global Capability was consistently and positively related to Magnitude. 
In all three regressions, Capability’s influence on the three different 
measures was significant at the .05 level, supporting the assertions of Dutton 
and Duncan (1987) and corroborating the similar findings of Chen, et. al. 
(1992).
Capability was positively related, but only at a = .10, to just one of the 
two measures of locus. External responses are generally pictured as being 
more difficult and requiring a greater amount of available resources than
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internal responses. When a restaurant believed it had enough resources to 
respond effectively it was more likely to attempt external responses.
Capability was also positively related to both measures of activeness, 
though to one only at the .10 significance level. A restaurant was more 
likely to face an issue squarely rather than avoid it by mere coping 
responses if its managers believed it had a strong capability in relation to the 
issue.
Taken as a whole, these results are very supportive of the idea that 
issue capability assessments are positively related to strategic momentum and 
change. Given the increasing importance of strategic change in our society 
and the concomitant interest in it in the academic community, these results 
may be an important finding (Stewart, 1993; Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). 
Strategic renewal, change, and corporate entrepreneurship may be more 
likely to occur in situations where managers are confident of their 
organization's overall capability. Of course, this begs the question, what 
influences such confidence? Given the narrow focus of this research, it is 
not possible to address this issue. The results do indicate that investigation 
that searches for such antecedents to perceptions of capability is a 
potentially fruitful pursuit. Of course, research on what leads to certain 
kinds of organizational capabilities has been occurring, most often in the 
organizational resources stream (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Hall, 1993; 
Peteraf, 1993). This dissertation adds a different twist to this stream by its 
focus on interpretations.
In a way, however, some of these issues were addressed here by the 
inclusion of component measures of capability. Drawing from various 
strategic management sources, a list of four capability areas was compiled:
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technological, organizational, financial, and human. These results speak to 
the question of what particular areas of capability seem to be most relevant.
Technological Capability was positively related to all measures of 
Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness, as hypothesized. The greater the 
confidence of an organization's managers in their use and knowledge of 
technology, the greater the magnitude, the more external the locus, and the 
higher the activeness of that organization's response set. Confidence in the 
technology area would probably come from past success at acquiring, 
understanding, and using new technologies as they emerged. As such, this 
confidence may lead to a willingness to take on riskier ventures, hence the 
results obtained in this study.
On the other hand, since the nutrition issue involves the area of 
technology in the development and preparation of new menu items, this 
result may be idiosyncratic to the particular issue studied, and might not 
have broad applicability. For example, technology capability might not have 
the same influence on responses to rising wages and the shortage of good 
workers. It is also possible that large, external, and active response sets and 
technology capability are both influenced by context, for example a 
Prospector strategy (Miles & Snow, 1978). A Prospector organization, given 
its focus on innovation and entering new markets, would have developed a 
strong technological capability and also tend to always respond to emerging 
issues in aggressive and proactive ways. In this case, technological 
capability and response would be correlated, but spuriously, given that each 
is heavily influenced by strategic orientation. Future research examining 
the generalizability of this finding to other issues and industries would prove 
useful, as would investigation of contextual effects. Research concerning
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the effects of strategy on interpretational activities has begun to address 
some of these issues (Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992).
Organization Capability (a confidence in the procedures, systems, 
policies, and guidelines of an organization) was negatively related to 
Magnitude and Activeness, contrary to expectations. Rather than facilitating 
responsiveness to the strategic issue in question, Organization Capability 
seemed to inhibit it, leading to smaller and more passive response sets. This 
negative relationship between Organization Capability and responsiveness 
would tend to support inertia theory that emphasizes the obstacles to  
organization change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelley & Amburgey, 1991; 
Huff, Huff & Thomas, 1992). In this case, strong capability in the 
organizational area represented a core rigidity, inhibiting responsiveness 
and change (Leonard-Barton, 1992). It may be that confidence in certain 
present capabilities, in this case structural and systems ones, may inhibit 
change rather than facilitate it, as suggested by Dutton and Duncan (1987). 
That previous strengths can hinder future change was the argument of 
Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg (1978), as they emphasized how past success 
can lead to future failure. The literature on strategic momentum and change 
(Miller & Friesen 1980; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986) also adds 
insight here. Since change is disruptive, organizations tend to change only 
when there is a significant need to do so, and then they tend to make large 
changes because the accumulated pressure to do so requires it. The managers 
think that since things are running so smoothly, why change them?
Both Financial and Human Capability failed to achieve significance in 
any regression. Financial Capability was consistently negatively correlated 
with the response variables, and Human was consistently positively
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correlated, but since the effects were relatively small and insignificant no 
implications can be drawn.
Given the manner in which different components of capability 
affected response, one potential avenue for future research is to examine the 
impact on organizational response of different aspects of capability. 
Organization and Financial capability consistently had negative regression 
coefficients while Technological and Human capability consistently had 
positive ones, although only Organization and Technological were  
significant. Would results similar to these be found if different issues or 
industries were studied? Such findings would increase our understanding of 
how organizational resources affect strategic issue response and strategic 
change. It may be that strengths in different resource areas will have even 
opposite impacts and this may vary in different contexts.
The hypotheses involving the interaction effects of the stock 
assessments were not supported. These interactions were all negatively, not 
positively, correlated with response Activeness and one interaction, that of 
Urgency (RS) and Capability was statistically significant. Given the scoring 
of the Urgency variable, the negative correlation indicated a positive 
interaction effect. When Urgency is high, Capability has a stronger effect 
on Activeness and vice versa. High Urgency may sensitize managers to 
prepare for active responses. In this environment of heightened awareness 
and readiness, Capability has a stronger effect. Likewise, when there is a 
high assessment of Capability, managers think they are able to respond 
actively to an issue, and so Urgency has a stronger motivational effect in this 
situation, as well. These findings are the opposite of what one would expect 
had threat rigidity (Staw, et. al., 1981) been operating. In this case, stronger 
Urgency would have weakened the effect of Capability. In urgent situations,
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Capability would not have much of an impact on how active the response set 
would be since the managers' reaction would be one of avoidance, 
justification, and passivity.
Some other interactions were significant although no hypotheses had 
been posited concerning them. The Urgency with Capability and Urgency 
with Understanding interactions had a positive effect in one of the three 
Magnitude equations. The interpretation is similar to that of Activeness. The 
restaurants in this sample, in responding to the nutrition awareness issue, 
seemed to have reacted in a rational manner insofar as the interaction terms 
could detect. Most of the interaction terms were not significant, however.
None of the hypotheses related to Response Immediacy were 
supported. It did not seem to matter at all whether the stock assessments were 
high or low along any of the three interpretation dimensions: there was no 
effect on how early a company seemed to respond to the issue of nutrition 
awareness. This result may have obtained because these variables do not 
actually have any affect on immediacy. Unfortunately, a different, 
methodological, consideration is very important here.
The issue of consumer nutrition awareness did not appear suddenly in 
the spring of 1990 as this research methodology presumes. By 1990, some 
restaurant companies had already responded to the consumer nutrition 
awareness trend in some way, and hence had very early responses to it, and 
low scores on immediacy (the earlier the response the lower the score). 
These companies, for example, may not have rated the issue as being very 
urgent in 1990 since they had already been dealing with it, some of them for 
quite some time. As such, the test of this hypothesis turned out not to be a 
very strong one.
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For a better test of the immediacy hypothesis, it would be necessary to 
use an issue that emerged more suddenly and with less warning. As 
previously noted, just because no one had made a strong, public connection 
between nutrition concerns and eating out at restaurants before Phil 
Sokolof's advertisements did not mean that restaurant executives were 
unaware of this trend or that they had not already responded to it. The 
opportunities for such responses muddied the data to such an extent that, if 
relationships did exist between the stock assessments and immediacy, the 
signal was swallowed up in the noise.
The possibilities of such a test remain promising, given that both 
Urgency and Understanding had the anticipated negative coefficients (given 
that smaller values of Immediacy indicated earlier responses). A test using 
an issue having better timing characteristics perhaps would uncover 
significant results, as have other studies that have examined response timing 
(for example, MacMillan, et. al., 1985; Chen &  MacMillan, 1992; Chen, et. al., 
1992).
Additional future research. Research using different strategic issues is 
needed to broaden the applicability of this dissertation's findings. Given that 
this research examined one particular issue in one particular industry, it 
may be that these results will not have much generalizability. It cannot be 
known if they do without additional studies in different industries with 
different issues. Such research should also involve studies that include 
multiple issues in one industry. In this way, the affect of different issue 
characteristics on interpretation and response, which were held constant in 
this study, could be ascertained. Such characteristics as suddenness of 
emergence, the legitimacy attainable from conforming, how many areas of 
the organization are affected, the degree of constituent multiplicity, the
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degree of dependence on relevant constituents, and the degree of 
consistency of the issue's demands with organizational goals (Oliver, 1991) 
could be ascertained for each issue. These characteristics could be assessed 
by an expert panel as was used here, and the relative effects of these 
characteristics tested against one another. Such a study could only be 
feasible if a few firms were selected and intensive access were allowed to 
investigators since the data collection would probably be time consuming. 
Also, more refined or different measures would be needed, given an 
executive's likely reluctance to answer similar questions about different 
issues several times.
Industry effects were also held constant in this study. While not 
mentioned explicitly in the model, it may be that consolidation, profitability 
levels, rivalry, threat of substitution, threat of entry, and the power of 
buyers and suppliers (Porter, 1980), to name some of the possibilities, may 
affect the way organizational managers interpret and respond to strategic 
issues. In this case, an issue that had very broad applicability, such as a 
change in a federal law or regulation (e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act 
or health care reform), could be selected and companies from various 
industries surveyed. If such research included firm-level contextual 
information, the topic of the relative impact of firm versus industry factors, 
long of interest in industrial organization (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991), 
could be addressed in the managerial interpretation arena.
There is also a host of firm-level variables that could have an impact 
on the interpretation-response relationship. These include age, size, 
strategy, structural characteristics, types of scanning systems, performance, 
top management team characteristics: the list is quite long. Research on how 
managerial cognitions influence strategy and other firm-level phenomena
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is common (Barr, Stimpert, &  Huff, 1992; Reger & Huff, 1993). Research 
investigating effects in the opposite direction should be continued, as well.
Also of interest in managerial interpretation is the influence of 
individual characteristics (Schneider & de Meyer, 1991). Research has 
shown that age, educational background, personal experiences, and 
functional orientation of managers have an impact on the strategies their 
companies are likely to employ and the financial performance they are 
likely to attain (Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Norburn, 1989). Tendencies of 
certain types of individuals toward certain types of interpretations may act 
as a mediative step in this relationship. Such research could extend to how 
individual differences (such as personality, age, gender) may affect 
interpretations.
One methodological improvement that could be made is to research an 
issue or issues of more recent vintage. While the company-level response 
rate was adequate, the individual one was lower, as was expected. Executives 
are probably more likely to provide information about recent events than 
ones less recent for the reasons of salience, interest, and ease of recall. 
Given the lead-times involved with dissertation research, the time factor was 
somewhat unavoidable in this case. This should not be the case in future 
endeavors. A good approach would be being prepared to act quickly with 
data collection for an "issue of opportunity." Questionnaires could be mailed 
early in an issue's evolution and the respondents later asked what they did in 
response.
Additional areas of relevance. This research has the potential for 
applicability to a wide arena of research streams. For example, Hall's (1984) 
"retained set" idea, within the context of the model delineated in this 
dissertation, relates very strongly to the idea of emergent strategies
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(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and the work in what has been termed the 
"learning school" of strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1990). It has been 
shown empirically that issue interpretation influences responses to new 
issues arising in the environment, and these responses represent the 
emergent aspects of what ends up being the realized strategy. It is thus 
possible to begin to understand the important factors in the formation of 
emergent strategies. Further research examining the influences of context, 
as has been suggested here, would go a long way toward bolstering our 
knowledge of such processes.
Research in the corporate social responsibility area may also be 
informed by these results. Factors that tend to increase or decrease corporate 
responsiveness to social needs are of interest here (Goodstein, 1994). This 
dissertation examined how organizations in one industry responded to the 
social concern of serving food that is healthier for consumers and 
demonstrated how interpretations of this issue influenced how they 
responded to it.
Given the importance of interpretation (opportunity versus threat) in 
most traditional strategic management models (Digman, 1986), these results 
also inform the areas of strategy-making and decision-making. Strategic 
control involves tracking premise validity and maintaining vigilant 
surveillance for environmental trends (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987). 
These results may form part of a descriptive model of these processes. 
Conclusion
Organizations must respond to strategic issues, social issues, 
competitive moves, crises, and institutional pressures. Understanding what 
influences the kinds of responses that organizations enact provides 
knowledge about an important area of strategic management and social
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responsibility. While many influences on organizational responses have 
been suggested, this dissertation has specifically examined the impact that 
issue interpretation has on organizational response by investigating how 
different restaurant organizations interpreted the issue of increased 
nutritional awareness in the spring of 1990 and what relationships these 
differing interpretations had on the responses that organizations made. In 
this way, interpretation has been highlighted as an important mediational 
step between the monitoring and scanning of the environment and taking 
action in response to it, a basic management activity.
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Appendix A - Glossary of Key Terms
Issue Capability - estimates of whether the organization has sufficient 
resources to adequately respond to a strategic issue.
Issue Response - the organizational reaction to a particular strategic
issue.
Issue Understanding - the degree of confidence the organization has 
that it knows or can determine an appropriate response to a particular 
strategic issue.
Issue Urgency - the cost of doing nothing in response to a strategic 
issue and how important it is for the organization to respond.
Response Activeness - the extent that the response deals with the 
actual issue or evades the issue through justification, denial, or other 
protective responses.
Response Assets - factors that an organization needs to be able to 
formulate a functional response to a particular strategic issue.
Response Certainty - the degree of understanding an organization has 
concerning the alternative actions it can take and the effectiveness of each 
of the alternatives.
Response Immediacy - the amount of time elapsed between the data 
interpretation and response stages.
Response Locus - the degree to which the response is internal or 
external.
Response Magnitude - the extent of the change or the degree the 
response might be considered revolutionary.
Strategic Issues - emerging developments that can have a major 
impact on the organization's strategy
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Strategic Issue Management (SIM) - the broad-based monitoring of the 
environment where strategic issues are interpreted, analyzed, and responded 
to.
Strategic Issue Management System - that part of an organization that 
perceives, analyzes, and responds to strategic issues.
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Appendix B - The Organizational Informant Scales
Issue Urgency Scale 
This is an issue that our organization must respond to.
This is an urgent issue.
This issue will be around for a long time.
There is very little time pressure associated with this responding to this 
issue. RS
This issue is very visible to the public.
This is not a very important issue. RS
This issue could develop into a crisis for our organization.
We must take action quickly to resolve this issue.
Issue Understanding Scale 
It is hard to understand which alternative response is likely to be most 
effective in the long run. RS 
I don't think that we are aware of all the response alternatives available to 
us. RS
There are many unknowns that could influence our response. RS 
We understand this issue.
To some extent we just have to guess which alternative will produce the most 
desirable outcome for our organization. RS 
It is easy to determine exactly which response alternatives are available.
It is relatively easy to evaluate the impact of each response alternative on 
the long-run well-being of our organization.
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Global Capability Scale 
We have enough resources to be able to respond effectively to this issue.
Due to a lack of resources, we are restricted in the kinds of responses we can 
make. RS
Our organization's capability gives us a broad range of response options.
The most effective responses are beyond our organization's capability. RS 
Sufficient resources exist for our organization to have great latitude as to 
which alternative response(s) we can implement.
Our organization is capable of responding effectively to this issue.
Since our organization has many resources, we can respond to this issue 
pretty much as we want to.
Component Capability Scale 
Please indicate the degree to which you think each of the following 
represented a strength or a weakness during this period.
- Financial Subscale 
Our organization's cash flow.
Our organization's capacity to take on more debt.
The availability of new equity financing.
The amount of cash and liquid assets our organization has on hand.
- Organization Subscale 
Our organization's reputation.
The administrative procedures of our organization.
Our organization's administrative systems.
The management techniques used by our organization.
Our organization's operational policies and guidelines.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
- Human Resource Subscale
The training and/or experience of our organization's managers and workers. 
The relationship between our organization and our franchisees.
The motivation of our organization's managers and workers.
The working relationships of our organization's managers and workers.
- Technology Subscale
Our organization's ability to develop new and/or innovative methods to serve 
our customers.
The usage of new technology in the design and operation of our restaurants. 
Our organization's proprietary information.
Our organization's skill at taking advantage of new technology and 
innovation.
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Appendix C - The Expert Questionnaire
During the mid- to late-1980s and the early 1990s, the American public 
became increasingly concerned with health. Part of this concern was 
reflected in a heightened interest in nutrition. Since the food offered 
by some restaurants has been traditionally perceived as unhealthy by 
many people, this increased interest in nutrition represented an issue 
that many restaurant companies, especially the fast-food ones, 
thought they must respond to.
Below is a list of hypothetical responses that restaurant chains could have 
implemented at the chain level in reaction to the nutrition trend. You 
are being asked to rate each of these responses as to its degree of 
responsiveness, its focus (external or internal), and its magnitude.
What follows is a brief description of what the terms responsiveness, focus. 
and magnitude mean.
Responsiveness - refers to whether or not the response directly addresses 
the nutrition issue and can vary between direct and indirect. A direct 
response deals squarely and straightforwardly with the nutrition 
issue, while an indirect response avoids the real issue or deals with it 
in a passive manner. For example, in the case of the Tylenol 
poisonings, a direct response would have been to pull all bottles of 
Tylenol off store shelves, while an indirect response would have been 
to announce the formation of a blue-ribbon panel to study the 
psychology of random poisonings.
Focus - refers to the area that the response targets for activity and can vary 
between internal and external. Internal responses make changes
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inside the organization while external responses make changes 
outside it. For example, in the case of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, an 
internal response would have been to tighten up Exxon's monitoring 
of oil rig captains, while an external response would have been to run 
advertisements stressing the company's otherwise outstanding safety 
record.
Magnitude - refers to the size and cost of the response in terms of resources 
and can vary between small & inexpensive and large & costly. For 
example, in the case of possible defects with a new automobile's gas 
cap, a large and expensive response would be to recall all the affected 
cars and to replace the gas caps, while a small and inexpensive 
response would be to mail customers a notice of the problem with 
instructions of how they could fix it themselves.
What follows is a description of what the numbers 1 through 4 correspond to 
for each of the response characteristics: responsiveness, focus, and 
magnitude.
1 2 3 4
Responsiveness Indirect Somewhat Somewhat Direct
Indirect Direct
Focus Internal Somewhat Somewhat External
Internal External
M agnitude Small & Somewhat Somewhat Large & 
CostlyInexpensive Small & Large &
Inexpensive Costly
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Responsiveness - direct deals squarely with the issue, indirect avoids the 
issue.
Focus - internal: changes inside the organization, external: changes outside 
it.
Magnitude - refers to the size and cost of the response in terms of resources.
For each possible response, please circle the number that best describes the 
degree of responsiveness, focus, and magnitude vou think the 
response has. Please answer thoughtfully and consider each of them 
as occurring at the chain le v e l.
Introduce a new, healthier product
Responsiveness 1 2  3 4
Focus 1 2  3 4
Magnitude 1 2  3 4
Use advertisements showing how healthy the food already is 
Provide nutrition information for customers
Use advertisements showing how healthy the food is compared to competitors
Increase R&D budget to develop healthier items
Form a committee to study the nutrition issue
Run ads contesting perceptions that the food is unhealthy
Offer more food that is perceived to be lower in fat (i.e., chicken vs. beef)
Increase the budget of the public relations office
Spend more resources to identify consumer eating trends
Cut the price of items that may be perceived as unhealthy
Increase the price of items that are perceived as healthy
Broaden food offerings (e.g., hamburger restaurant opens salad bar)
Donate money to promote public nutrition awareness
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Do not change product offerings because nutrition is not an important issue 
with customers 
Adjust profit forecasts
Run ads showing the non-nutrition benefits of fast food 
Change names of items to make them sound healthier 
Discontinue advertising higher-fat items 
Discontinue serving higher fat items
Report to shareholders/owners that difficult times may lie ahead
Study feasibility of opening a healthier-menu fast food store
Begin to poll franchisees more often for market information
Merge or acquire another fast-food restaurant
Seek a buyer for the business
Communicate need for changes to franchisees
Test market healthier menu ideas
Begin to offer lower-fat items not offered before (e. g. lower-fat desserts - 
yogurt)
Increase advertising on items perceived to be unhealthy to increase sales 
Offer sales on items higher in fat
Increase expansion in areas not as affected by nutrition issue
Stress superiority of cooking method used over that of competitors
Change production methods to reduce fat content in food
Test market items with lower-fat ingredients
Increase resources used for market intelligence
Copy competitors successful ad campaign or product roll-out
Run ads showing food items being consumed by active people who work-out
Introduce healthier reformulation of existing product
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Appendix D - Cover Letter
We are engaged in some exciting research involving the restaurant 
industry. After working with restaurateurs during the last twelve years we 
have developed a master list of special restaurant executives to participate in 
a major restaurant research activity. Our advisors have nominated you and 
your organization to be a part of this special project.
Our expert panel of restaurateurs, together with our faculty, have 
helped develop the enclosed questionnaire. This questionnaire is concerned 
with basic management practices and activities of special restaurant owners 
here in the United States.
We are asking you (and the other recommended executives) to 
complete this questionnaire and return it to us by March 18, 1994. The 
confidential questionnaire will take only about twenty minutes to complete. 
(No individual responses will ever be reported - only the total group 
responses will be combined and analyzed.)
Thank you very much for your assistance and participation.
Sincerely,
Robert T. Justis 
Professor 
Scott D. Julian 
Research Associate
Encl. - study questionnaire, SASE
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Appendix E - Organizational Informant Questionnaire, Page 1
Organizational Responses to Consumer Nutrition Awareness
Questionnaire
In the spring and summer of 1990 an organization called the National 
Heart Savers Association (NHSA) ran a series of aggressive advertisements 
aimed at several restaurants in the fast-food industry. A copy of one of these 
ads is included for your examination (see attachment A). The purpose of the 
NHSA's campaign was to heighten consumer's nutrition awareness and to get 
the fast-food industry to offer healthier menu selections. Although  
consumers had been increasingly aware of nutritional concerns for years, 
the NHSA campaign brought this issue to the forefront.
This questionnaire is designed to capture your organization's 
impressions of the consumer nutrition awareness issue during the spring 
and summer of 1990 and what actions your organization has subsequently 
taken in response to it. The questionnaire has four parts: A) General 
Information, B) Impressions of the Nutrition-Awareness Issue, C) Your 
Organization, and D) Actions Taken in Response to the Issue.
A) General Information - Please write the answers to the following questions 
in the spaces provided. Please be assured that all of your answers will be 
kept completely confidential.
1) What was your position in the company in the spring and summer of 1990?
2) What were your job duties in this position?
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3) How would you characterize your company's performance in the spring 
and summer of 1990? Were sales and profits increasing, stagnant, or 
decreasing? How was your performance in relation to your competitors?
4) What trends and issues were affecting the restaurant industry in the 
spring and summer of 1990?
5) What opportunities and threats was your particular company facing in the 
spring and summer of 1990?
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Appendix F - Strategic Issue Response 
Implementation Frequency (n = 89)
Response Description Frequency
Introduce a new, healthier product 71
Offer more food that is perceived to be lower in fat (i.e., 70
chicken vs. beef)
Begin to offer lower-fat items not offered before (e. g. lower- 58
fat desserts - yogurt)
Test market healthier menu ideas 55
Broaden food offerings (e.g., hamburger restaurant opens 52
salad bar)
Test market items with lower-fat ingredients 49
Provide nutrition information for customers 46
Advertisements showing how healthy food already is 37
Increase R&D budget to develop healthier items 36
Change production methods to reduce fat content in food 33
Spend more resources to identify consumer eating trends 33
Introduce healthier reformulation of existing product 27
Increase resources used for market intelligence 25
Communicate need for changes to franchisees 24
Form a committee to study the nutrition issue 21
Stress superiority of cooking method used over that of 21
competitors
Increase the budget of the public relations office 18
Merge or acquire another fast-food restaurant 17
Begin to poll franchisees more often for market information 16
Use advertisements showing how healthy the food is compared 14
to competitors
Do not change product offerings because nutrition is not an 14
important issue with customers 
Adjust profit forecasts 14
Study feasibility of opening a healthier-menu fast food store 12
Change names of items to make them sound healthier 11
Copy competitors successful ad campaign or product roll-out 10
Increase the price of items that are perceived as healthy 10
Increase expansion in areas not as affected by nutrition issue 8
Increase advertising on items perceived to be unhealthy to 8
increase sales
Run ads showing food items being consumed by active people 7
who work-out
Discontinue serving higher fat items 7
Donate money to promote public nutrition awareness 7
Seek a buyer for the business 5
Run ads contesting perceptions that the food is unhealthy 4
Cut the price of items that may be perceived as unhealthy 3
Run ads showing the non-nutrition benefits of fast food 2
Discontinue advertising higher-fat items 2
Offer sales on items higher in fat 1
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Appendix G - Classification of Responses
Using the Expert Median Scores 
Frequency
Magnitude
Large 8
Small 8
Not Classified 22
Locus
External 20
Internal 8
Not Classified 10
Activeness 
Active 18
Passive 8
Not Classified 12
All subsections of the right column 
sum to 38.
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